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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING INTENT
Intent lies at the heart of employment discrimination law. For the
vast majority of cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of
1964 and 1991, intent alone determines whether a violation has oc-
curred.' Interpretation of the intent requirement, however, has created
enormous difficulties, distorting the very meaning of "discrimination"
itself.2
1 There are two basic models of discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). One model covers disparate treatment, which
require a showing of intentional discrimination. The second model covers claims that a neutral
policy has had a disparate impact on a protected group. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYmENT DisCIuMINAnON 93-94 (4th ed. 1997). The large majority
of cases brought under Title VII follow the disparate treatment model. See John J. Donohue
IHi & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43
STAN. L. REv. 983, 989 (1991) (stating that in 1989 only 101 of the 7,613 employment dis-
crimnination cases brought were disparate impact).
2 See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fal-
lacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINos L.J. 57
(1991) (describing the debate among the courts over the quantity of proof sufficient to hold the
employer liable); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The hn-
proper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. Rav. 203, 220
n.64 (1993) (describing the debate over sufficiency of proof to withstand a defense motion for
summary judgment).
There are four sections of Title VII that are relevant to the meaning of intent in employ-
ment discrimination. Section 2000e-2(a), which imposes liability for job discrimination
against individuals, states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
The remedial portion of the Act states in relevant part:
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Although scholars have struggled with the meaning of discrimina-
tory intent, the courts have settled on a simplistic definition.3 According
to the courts, an employer intentionally discriminates only if he4 acts
with a conscious discriminatory intent or motive. That is, the employer
must be aware that he is motivated by the protected characteristic - race,
color, gender, national origin or religion - at the time he makes the ad-
verse employment decision. As Justice Brennan stated in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins:
In saying that gender played a motivating part in an em-
ployment decision, we mean that, if we asked the em-
ployer at the moment of the decision what its reasons
were and if we received a truthful response, one of those
reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a
woman.5
Although appealing in its simplicity, this explanation reflects a mis-
understanding of the current nature of prejudice and how it results in
(1) If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the com-
plaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropri-
ate,. . . with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment
agency, or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlaw-
ful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1)(1994) (emphasis added).
Section 2000e-6(a), which applies to a pattern and practice of discrimination clearly re-
quires an intent to discriminate:
(a) Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person
or group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights secured by this title, and that the pattern or prac-
tice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of the rights
herein described, the Attorney General may bring a civil action in the appropri-
ate district court of the United States...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)(1994) (emphasis added).
Finally, the 1991 amendments to the Act provide for recovery of compensatory and puni-
tive damages under Title VII, limiting recovery of damages to actions of intentional discrimi-
nation, as opposed to cases alleging disparate impact. Sea 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (a)(1)(1994).
3 Justice Stewart explained:
'Disparate treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
4 I use the term "he" for simplification because most employers are still male. Of
course, an employer can also be a woman.
5 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
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discriminatory behavior.6 Social science research demonstrates that the
nature of discrimination has changed since the passage of the Civil
Rights Act in 1964.7 In 1964 racially and sexually discriminatory acts
and attitudes were overt and even condoned by society, but education
efforts since 1964 have succeeded in eliminating from the general popu-
lace approval of overt discriminatory acts and attitudes.8 Racial and gen-
der discrimination have gone underground. Social Science research
demonstrates beyond debate that discriminatory attitudes and behavior
still exist today and a large percentage of bias and prejudice and the
resultant discriminatory behavior is due to unconscious factors.9
The first problem with the intent requirement is that as defined by
the courts, "discriminatory intent" represents an outdated view of human
behavior, a view contradicted by overwhelming scientific evidence. Per-
sons whose acts result from bias and prejudice are often unaware of their
subconscious motivations. Thus, it is likely that differential treatment of
a female or minority employee in the workplace is because of his race or
her gender, even though the employer is unaware that race or gender
6 See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161
(1995).
7 See discussion infra Part I. The historical circumstances leading up to the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 inform our understanding of the original meaning of the intent
requirement of Title VII. The Act resulted from years of racial and political unrest, racial
violence stemming from the assertion of the rights of blacks in the South, the Civil Rights
Movement, non-violent marches led by the Reverend Martin Luther King, and violent treat-
ment of African American children who participated in civil rights marches in Birmingham in
May, 1963. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 Crvu. RIGHTS AcT 17-20 (1985).
Because race discrimination resulted, at that time, from an overt invidious animus against
persons of color, an animus that was obvious to all viewing historical events from their living
rooms, the Congressional debate leading up to the passage of the law focused on the immoral-
ity of overt racism. In this climate, Congress never discussed, and may never have even con-
sidered, the possibility of unconscious discrimination. Congress appears to have assumed that
discrimination "because of' race is equivalent to conscious, intentional, and perhaps invidious
discrimination.
8 See discussion infra Part I.
9 See infra Part I. Much of the Congressional debate paralleled the thought process
prevalent in the field of psychology. In Psychology and Prejudice: A Historical Analysis and
Integrative Framework, 47 ANMR. PSYCHOL. 1182 (1992), Professor John Duckitt explains that
in the 1950's a new paradigm for viewing prejudice developed in the field of Psychology that
explained prejudice as being caused by pathological personality structures. See id. at 1186.
According to Duckitt, this paradigm was a reaction to the Hitler regime and atrocities commit-
ted against the Jews in Europe. See id.
In the 1960's Psychology shifted its theory of the origins of prejudice from abnormal
individual psychology to societal causes. This shift was due largely to the need to explain the
prevalence of prejudice in the South. See id. at 1187. During the early stage of this theory,
psychologists opined that prejudice was embedded in the social environment, primarily as a
result of socialization and a need to conform. They theorized that once desegregation oc-
curred, blacks and whites would live harmoniously. See id. The primary goal, therefore, was
integration.
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motivated the differential treatment. A rule limiting the definition of dis-
crimination to cases where the employer consciously treated an em-
ployee differently because of membership in a protected class ignores the
social science evidence and narrows the effectiveness of the statute.
A second failure exacerbates the problems with the intent require-
ment. Based on the erroneous assumption that discriminatory intent is
necessarily conscious, the Supreme Court created artificial proof con-
structs designed to ascertain whether discriminatory intent exists.' 0 The
purpose of these constructs is to determine, in the absence of direct evi-
dence of discriminatory intent, whether the employer relied on the em-
ployee's protected characteristic in making the employment decision. In
fact, these proof constructs, as originally designed and interpreted, were
generally effective in separating discriminatory decisions, both conscious
and unconscious, from non-discriminatory ones." That is, the proof
mechanisms serve the role of determining causation rather than con-
scious intent, assuring that the underlying employment decision is made
because of the employee's protected characteristic, either with or without
the employer's conscious awareness. Ironically, however, courts origi-
nally applying these proof constructs erroneously assumed that the con-
structs identified an employer's conscious intent to discriminate.
There was, in sum, a dislocation between the theoretical justifica-
tion for the proof mechanisms designed to identify conscious discrimina-
tory intent and the reality that these mechanisms could also identify
unconscious discrimination. This dislocation caused the emergence of a
critique, which I term the "counter-evolution," often resulting in a con-
servative shift in proof and evidentiary standards. In some circum-
stances, the critique focuses on the proof mechanisms, demonstrating
that basic assumptions underlying them were erroneous; 12 in others, it
limits the statute by holding irrelevant important evidence of discrimina-
tion. In either case, the counter-evolution is based on a concept of dis-
crimination narrowly limited to consciously discriminatory acts.
Accepting this basic concept, the critique itself is often theoretically
sound.
10 In some cases, Congress has explicitly adapted these constructs as subsequent amend-
ments to the statute. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (k) (1994) (codifying the disparate impact
model). In others, Congress has left the evolution of the proof constructs to the courts. See,
e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097
(2000) (cases discussing the relative burdens of proof and production in a disparate treatment
case).
11 See discussion infra Part I.
12 See, e.g., Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,
93 MiCH. L. REv. 2229 (1994).
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The underlying concept, however, is flawed because it defines dis-
crimination in the narrowest of terms, looking only to the conscious
thought process of the employer rather than to the treatment of the em-
ployee or to its effect on the employee. A more comprehensive defini-
tion of discrimination that would include differential treatment of
members of protected classes, whether caused by conscious or uncon-
scious motivation, would more appropriately further the goal of the stat-
ute to create equal opportunity for all qualified workers.
This article analyzes the different proof mechanisms developed
under Title VII discriminatory treatment doctrine, demonstrating their
ability to identify unconscious, as well as conscious, discriminatory be-
havior. It demonstrates that soon after its enactment Title VII began to
evolve, 13 expanding its reach to unconscious discrimination. Although
in many instances courts were unaware of this expansion, courts appear
to have followed their intuition to further the broad remedial and preven-
tive purposes of the statute. In response to the evolution and to the
courts' failure to articulate a justification for their decisions, a counter-
evolution is currently occurring, with many courts attempting rigidly to
adhere to the narrowest definition of discrimination.
I argue that courts and legislatures should reject the new critique by
openly providing a theoretical justification for existing methodologies
that explicitly incorporates into the law the psychological and sociologi-
cal evidence demonstrating that discriminatory behavior results from
both conscious and unconscious bias, prejudice and stereotyping.
13 Professor Michael Selmi disputes that there has been any change in Supreme Court
jurisprudence concerning discrimination law. According to Professor Selmi, the Court has
consistently recognized only the most overt forms of discrimination. See Michael Selmi,
Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279'
(1997). Although apparently diametrically opposed to Professor Selmi's position, my point is
not really the exact opposite of Selmi's. I agree that the Court's decisions have most often
required a showing of overt discrimination in order to hold a defendant liable; that the Court's
anti-discrimination rhetoric has masked more conservative results; and that the evidentiary
constructs developed by the Court are applied in a manner that denies the existence of subtle
discrimination.
This article demonstrates, however, that these constructs are capable of holding liable employ-
ers who discriminated unconsciously and that in the early days of their existence they actually
did hold liable employers who may have discriminated unconsciously. The evolution I see is a
movement from a narrow definition of intentional discrimination to a broader definition that
encompasses conscious and unconscious discrimination. This movement was not made ex-
press. In fact, most courts were likely unaware of the possible use of the constructs to hold
employers liable for unconscious discrimination. A counter-evolution is occurring in which
many lower courts narrow the evidentiary constructs, limiting findings of discrimination to the
most overt and direct evidence of discriminatory motive.
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I. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH DEMONSTRATING THE
UNCONSCIOUS CAUSES OF DISCRIMINATORY
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR
A number of legal scholars have written extensively about the un-
conscious nature of discrimination. 14 Professor Charles Lawrence first
identified unconscious racism as the source of much discriminatory be-
havior.' 5 Relying on studies demonstrating unconscious stereotyping,
Professor David Benjamin Oppenheimer proposed that employers should
have a duty to eliminate unconscious stereotypes from their decision-
making process and should be liable for negligently breaching that
duty. 16 Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger agreed with Professor Law-
rence about the unconscious nature of discrimination but disagreed that
the source of discrimination was primarily unconscious motivation. 17 In-
stead, Professor Krieger applied social cognition theory to employment
discrimination law and argued that discrimination law is fundamentally
flawed because it does not take into consideration how decisionmaking
occurs. 18 According to Krieger, discriminatory stereotypes result from
the normal cognitive process of categorization rather than the invidious
intent presumed by the law.19 While the law focuses on the moment that
the decision is made, Krieger demonstrates that cognitive theory empha-
sizes the manner in which information about ingroups and outgroups is
processed and retrieved. 20 According to cognitive theory, the normal
process of categorization distorts the decisionmaker's perception, mem-
ory and recall, leading to a biased decision even though the employer is
unaware of his or her bias.21 Krieger hesitated to make a proposal for
determining liability of the decision maker because psychology had not
established a means for reducing cognitive errors in assessing
employees .22
Krieger's work is immensely important because it confirms the un-
conscious nature of stereotype-based decisionmaking, it extends the anal-
ysis of Professors Lawrence and Oppenheimer and it creates a deeper
understanding of the intractibility of stereotypes due to their cognitive
14 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Neg-
ligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. Rnv. 899 (1993); Linda Hamilton Krieger, supra note 6.
15 See Lawrence, supra note 14.
16 See Oppenheimer, supra note 14.
17 See Krieger, supra note 6, at 1164 n.11.
18 See id. at 1167.
19 See id. at 1187-90.
20 See id. at 1191-92.
21 See id. at 1199.
22 See id. at 1247.
2000]
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origin. Krieger's article, however, focuses almost exclusively on cogni-
tive processing mistakes that cause bias.
This article's analysis of the social science research goes one step
further. First, it includes very recent psychological studies, some of
which challenge the view that cognitive theory alone accounts for uncon-
scious discrimination. This newer research presents a more nuanced
view of the important contribution of motivation and affect to stereotype
formation, activation and inhibition, while simultaneously confirming the
unconscious nature of stereotyping and the behavior it produces. Sec-
ond, it includes sociological studies of organizational behavior in the
workforce that enhance our understanding of the operation of stereotypes
and how they become socially activated. The sociological studies play a
vital complementary role in understanding the nature of bias and preju-
dice and how it is acted out in the workforce. 23 Finally, this article con-
siders scientific evidence concerning the effectiveness of ameliorating
biased responses, as conducted in individual laboratory test, meta-analy-
ses and observational field study work. Although bias and prejudice are
enduring phenomena, these latter studies suggest that there are important
specific behaviors that employers can use in order to reduce bias result-
ing from unconscious factors.
Scientific research concerning the nature and origins of prejudice
and its influence on discriminatory behavior is vast and complicated.
Early in the twentieth century psychologists attributed stereotyping and
discrimination to the affect24 of the discriminator toward members of the
outgroup. 25 Generally, this body of science held that intergroup contact
created affective responses or feelings, which were often negative.2 6
These feelings, according to this view, created consciously-held attitudes
of ingroup members toward members of the outgroup and vice versa.27
At the time of the passage of Title VII in 1964, these views dominated
the psychological literature.
23 In fact, sociological studies may be even more relevant to the workforce since psycho-
logical studies tend to focus on the reaction of individuals to controlled stimulus in laboratory
environments.
24 The term "affect" has a number of meanings in the psychological literature, "spanning
the range of generalized arousal, specific emotions, transient mood states, and evaluative reac-
tions." David L. Hamilton et al., The Influence of Affect on Stereotyping: The Case of Illusory
Correlation, in AFFECT, COGNmON AND STEREOTYPING 39, 40 (Diane M. Mackie & David L.
Hamilton eds., 1993). The term "affect" is used herein to mean the mood state of the person.
25 See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Emotions, Arousal, and Stereotypic Judgments: A Heuris-
tic Model of Affect and Stereotyping, in Ai'scr, CoGNmIoN, AND STEREOTYPING 13, 14 (Di-
ane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
26 See Steven J. Stroessner & Diane M. Mackie, Affect and Perceived Group Variability:
Implications for Stereotyping and Prejudice, in A'-zcT, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 63
(Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
27 See id.
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In the 1970's, however, psychologists began to reevaluate the
causes of prejudice and discrimination. During the next fifteen to twenty
years, psychologists have focused on cognition instead of affect as the
cause of attitudes that group members hold about members of other
groups. 28 Cognitive theory identifies common human information
processing mechanisms as responsible for creating stereotypes and the
resulting discrimination.29 This cognitive approach theorizes that stereo-
types and discriminatory attitudes result from humans' natural cognitive
processing system which allows persons to know the world through cate-
gorization. Unfortunately, once formed in the individual, stereotypes
will distort the perception, memory and recall with reference to outgroup
members. The evaluator will view a member of an outgroup consistent
with the stereotype whether it applies in fact to the individual or not.
Psychologists are beginning to discover, however, that the nature of prej-
udice and stereotypes is more complex than scientists previously be-
lieved. Neither affective response nor cognitive theory, standing alone,
can account for the presence of stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes. 30
Instead, whites' prejudicial attitudes and behaviors toward blacks
result from a complex interaction of motivational, cognitive and cultural
factors. 31 Motivational factors include a need for self-esteem and status,
which can result in justifying harmful behavior toward blacks by blaming
or denigrating the black person harmed. 32 As explained above, cognitive
factors deal with the automatic categorization and processing of informa-
tion about different groups of people.33 Research demonstrates, for ex-
ample, that the mere categorization of persons into groups causes inter-
group bias.34 Socio-cultural factors contributing to prejudices include
cultural stereotypes, portrayals by mass media, institutional racism and
historical and contemporary differences in power and prestige.35 As one
psychologist described:
Any particular form of stereotyping or prejudice... is in all likeli-
hood determined by cognitive, motivational, and social learning
28 See David L. Hamilton & Diane M. Mackie, Cognitive and Affective Processes in
hztergroup Perception: The Developing Interface, in AR-acr, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING
1 (Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton eds., 1993).
29 See id.; see also Krieger, supra note 6, at 1187-88.
30 See Hamilton & Mackie, supra note 28, at 4-5.
31 See David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Troller, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview
of the Cognitive Approach, in PRErtmicE, DIscRIMINATIoN, AND RACISM 127, 153 (John F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
32 See Irwin Katz et al., Racial Ambivalence, Value Duality, and Behavior in PRE. IcE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 35, 45 (John L. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
33 See John L. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Changes in the Expression and Assess-
ment of Racial Prejudice in OPENING DOORS: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE RELATIONS IN CONTEM-
PORARY AMERICA 128 (H. Knopke, I. Norrell, & R. Rogers eds., 1991) [hereinafter Changes].
34 See id. at 128.
35 See id. at 129.
20001
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processes, whose effects combine in a given social context to produce
specific judgmental and behavioral manifestations. Therefore, any at-
tempt to understand such phenomena as a product of one process alone is
probably misguided.36
While the new psychological literature continues to demonstrate the
key role that cognitive processing plays in prejudice and discrimination,
it also demonstrates that affect or mood likely impacts a person's ability
and/or motivation 37 to process information about a member of an out-
group efficiently, often inhibiting processing of new information.38 If
the person has already formed a stereotype, affect may inhibit the
processing of information that is inconsistent with the stereotype, leading
to attitudes more aligned with the stereotype. 39
In the case of race prejudice, culturally transmitted stereotypes have
already formed in the individual's mind. The question then becomes
whether and under what conditions an evaluator can consider informa-
tion that is inconsistent with 'the stereotype. Research shows that stereo-
types are enduring and intransigent. Even when faced with evidence
contradicting the stereotype, subjects often ignore the contradictory evi-
dence and resort to the stereotype.40
A person's affect or mood may affect his ability to reject the stereo-
type and to consider new information. Studies show that persons who
have positive affect - those in a happy mood - process new information
less and rely more heavily on previously-formed stereotypes than per-
sons who have a neutral affect. 4' Thus, in the employment setting, a
happy white manager may rely more on stereotypes in judging his black
employee than a manager who is in a neutral mood.42 Positive mood
states create more reliance on stereotyping because they inhibit the
evaluator's ability to process information that differentiates from the so-
36 Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 31, at 153.
37 See Bodenhausen, supra note 25, at 13, 24 (concluding that it was unclear whether the
mood affected the subject's ability to process information or his motivation to process infor-
mation.); see also, Hamilton et al. supra note 24, at 56 (concluding that the happy and sad
moods more likely affected the ability to process information, rather than the motivation).
38 Because a particular affect or mood can inhibit cognitive processing of information,
affect or mood can cause different results depending on whether the mood occurs before or
after stereotype formation.
39 See Bodenhausen, supra note 25, at 25-29. If, however, the individual has not yet
formed a stereotype, affect, by inhibiting processing of stereotypical information, will impede
the formation of stereotypes.
40 See Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The
Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1147-1148 (1995).
41 See id.
42 This result is counter-intuitive because one would assume that a happy person would
be less judgmental and more open to judging a person of another race charitably.
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cial stereotype. 43 Thus, the individual relies on the stereotype in making
its judgments. 44
Although nuanced and apparently contradictory, this research has
one conclusion in common: these moods do not seem to create a con-
scious understanding of their effect on the evaluator's judgment. Instead,
the affect contributes or detracts from the evaluator's ability or motiva-
tion to process the inconsistent information, unconsciously influencing
the evaluation by creating either more or less reliance on the
stereotype. 45
No matter how the interaction of cognitive, affective and motiva-
tional factors occurs, social science research demonstrates that race and
gender bias and prejudice resulting in discriminatory behavior are the
result of unconscious, as well as conscious, phenomena.46 As one group
of psychologists stated:
The truth of the matter is that events and operations that completely
evade conscious apprehension frequently trigger our evaluations, impres-
sions and behavioral responses. Tugged in one direction, or pulled in
another, our actions are often driven by a multitude of cognitively impen-
etrable mental processes. 47
A. RACE DATA"8
Relying on cognitive, motivational and socio-cultural factors, a
number of current theories account for discriminatory attitudes and be-
43 See Bodenhausen, supra note 25, at 24-25.
44 The results for persons in sad moods are contradictory. Some studies suggest that
persons in sad moods tend to spend more time processing information that deviates from the
stereotype, thus inhibiting the evaluator's reliance on stereotypes. See id. at 19. Other re-
searchers have found that in some instances, a sad mood, like happy moods, can create reliance
on stereotypes. See Hamilton et al., supra note 24, at 55.
45 See, e.g., David A. Wilder, The Role of Anxiety in Facilitating Stereotypic Judgments
of Outgroup Behavior in Asmcr, COGNMON, AND STEREOTYPING 87, 106 (Diane M. Mackie
& David L. Hamilton eds., 1993) (concluding that anxiety unconsciously created more reliance
on stereotypes of outgroups).
46 Compare Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Stereotypic Responses: Implications
for Prejudice Reduction Efforts, 92-96 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin - Madison) (suggesting that although stereotypes occur as a result of unconscious
processes, at least low-prejudiced individuals are aware of their stereotypic responses and may
be able to control them with training).
47 C. Neil Macrae et al., On Activating Exemplars, 34 J. EXPERuMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL.
330, 344 (1998) (citations omitted).
48 By discussing race and gender social science data separately, I do not intend to ignore
the very real problem of intersectionality. This concept, of particular importance to women of
color, demonstrates that a woman of color is not subject only to sex discrimination or to race
discrimination. Nor is the discrimination she suffers the sum of sex and race discrimination.
Instead, intersectionality demonstrates that women of color suffer a different quality and type
of discrimination, formed at the intersection of membership in two underclasses. See
generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
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haviors: ambivalence, 49 modem racism/symbolic racism 50 and aversive
racism.51 While these theories differ slightly, they share the common
notion that racist behavior and/or attitudes are often rooted in uncon-
scious factors.52
In PREJUDICE, DISCRIMNA'ION AND RACISM, leading psychologists
describe experiments examining the "causes and consequences of con-
temporary forms of prejudice, discrimination, and racism",53 demonstrat-
ing that racism and prejudice have changed fundamentally since the
passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. While earlier, "old fashioned"
racism was overt and accepted, prejudicial attitudes and behavior have
become unacceptable in mainstream white America.54 Although the per-
centage of whites with overt racist prejudices against blacks dropped
precipitously between 1933 and 1988,55 Dovidio and Gaertner demon-
strate in Changes in the Expression and Assessment of Racial Preju-
dice,5 6 that even whites who consider themselves to be liberal and
egalitarian on race issues harbor unconscious racist attitudes and behave
in racist fashion toward blacks,57 often unaware that their responses are
race-based. 58 According to Dovidio and Gaertner, this form of racism,
identified as "aversive racism," results from whites' assimilation of an
egalitarian value system with "impressions derived from human cogni-
tive mechanisms that contribute to the development of stereotypes and
prejudice, and ... feelings and beliefs derived from historical and con-
temporary cultural racist contexts. ' 59 Simply put, whites demonstrate an
ambivalence toward blacks. While consciously holding egalitarian val-
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991). Unfortunately, most of the
social science research deals with either sex or with race.
49 See Katz et al., supra note 32 at 56.
50 See John B. McConahay, Modem Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modem Racism
Scale in PEJUDIcE, DIsCRuINATIoN AND RAcism 91, 92 (Dovidio & Gaertner eds., 1986).
51 See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism:
Historical Trends and Contemporary Approaches in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINAAIOrN, AND RA-
CISM 1, 21 (Dovidio & Gaertner eds., 1986) [hereinafter Historical Trends].
52 See id. at 21; see also Katz, supra note 32, at 47.
53 See Historical Trends, supra note 51, at 18.
54 See Changes, supra note 33, at 120.
55 Dovidio and Gaertner note that when asked the question, "Do you think Negroes are
as intelligent as white people - that is, can they learn things just as well if they are given the
same education and training?" in 1942, 47% of whites responded affirmatively while in 1968
80% said yes. See Changes, supra note 33, at 120.
There has been a dramatic shift in attitudes of whites toward desegregation. Whereas in
1942, 2% of Southerners and 40% of Northerners believed that blacks and whites should at-
tend school together, by 1982, over 90% of all white respondents said that blacks and whites
should attend school together. See id. at 124.
56 See Changes, supra note 33.
57 See id.
58 See, e.g., PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND RACISM (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L.
Gaertner, eds., 1986).
59 See Changes supra note 33, at 131.
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ues, whites simultaneously harbor unconscious negative feelings towards
blacks as a result of cognitive and motivational biases combined with
socialization into a racist culture.60
In tests revealing white attitudes toward blacks,61 Dovidio and
Gaertner found that there was a difference between whites' conscious
and unconscious attitudes:
Even unconsciously, positive characteristics were associ-
ated more with whites than with blacks. For negative
traits, however, there was a discrepancy between uncon-
scious and conscious responding. Specifically, negative
characteristics were responded to significantly faster fol-
lowing a black prime than following a white prime.
Thus, even though at a conscious level whites reject neg-
ative attributions of blacks, at an unconscious level they
do have negative associations. This study therefore pro-
vides direct support for our assumption that people who
consciously and genuinely embrace egalitarian ideals
may, outside of their awareness, still harbor negative
feelings toward blacks.62
Dovidio and Gaertner's research strongly suggests that whites act
on these unconscious negative feelings when they are able to justify their
actions. For example, in one experiment Dovidio and Gaertner created
an "emergency" situation in which black and white victims asked white
bystanders for help. They found that whites normally helped black vic-
60 See id; see also, John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and
Controlled Processes, 33 1. ExPERME=AL Soc. PSYCHOL. 510, 534 (1997) (supporting the
aversive racism theory of Dovidio and Gaertner by offering evidence that Whites reporting
nonprejudiced attitudes on traditional measures of prejudice harbor unconscious negative atti-
tudes toward Blacks).
61 Dovidio and Gaertner studied liberal whites' attitudes toward blacks. White subjects,
when asked to evaluate blacks and whites on a scale, rated both positively, but rated whites
more positively than blacks. See Changes, supra note 33, at 134-135. Although the bias in
attitudes was subtle, it was clearly present. Dovidio and Gaertner followed up these self-report
studies with reaction time experiments demonstrating that while whites did not associate nega-
tive characteristics more frequently with blacks than with whites, they did associate positive
characteristics more with whites than with blacks. See id. at 136.
Concerned that liberal whites may have mediated their evaluation of blacks consciously
to avoid appearing biased, the authors of the study then adopted a method for studying uncon-
scious processes. White subjects were exposed subliminally to the words "black" or "white"
before exposure to other words. White subjects responded more positively to the words fol-
lowing the white subliminal message than those following the black subliminal message. See
id. at 137-138.
The results of these and other experiments confirm Dovidio and Gaertner's hypothesis
that even white persons who believe in racial equality have unconscious prejudicial attitudes
toward blacks and behave in a discriminatory fashion toward blacks without being aware of
the discrimination.
62 Id. at 138.
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tirs slightly more than white victims if there was no one else present to
help. Whites' helping behavior toward black victims dropped dramati-
cally, however, in situations where another potential helper was pres-
ent.63 Where others were present, whites helped black victims only
about half as often as white victims.64 The authors concluded that the
whites were able to maintain their self-esteem in spite of their failure to
help blacks because others were there to help. Thus, whites were able to
maintain their egalitarian self-image while simultaneously discriminating
against blacks without being consciously aware of the discrimination.
Where there were no others present, whites could generally not refuse to
help blacks without damaging their egalitarian self-image because there
was no non-discriminatory reason for the failure to help. 65
Similar results occurred in tests conducted by Professors Katz,
Wackenhutt and Glass.66 Their experiments demonstrated that white sub-
jects reacted more strongly toward blacks than toward whites depending
on the situation. For example, Katz instructed white male college stu-
dents to give electric shocks67 for errors made by white or black students
working at learning a task. White students who administered the shocks
could choose between administering a mild or a severe shock. While
explaining their reasons for selecting the more severe shock, white stu-
dents described the black students receiving the severe shock in a much
more derogatory fashion than they rated their white counterparts. This
more salient reaction results from an ambivalence produced by a tension
in American values between equality and individualism.68 White stu-
dents experiencing ambivalent attitudes of prejudice and sympathy to-
ward blacks needed to justify the harm done through shocking the black
63 See id. at 134.
64 See id.
65 See id. In a more recent experiment simulating jury duty where white college students
acted as jurors, the students favored imposing the death penalty on a white defendant more
frequently than on a black defendant who had committed the identical crime where all of the
other jurors were white and they all spoke in favor of the death penalty. Curiously, this dy-
namic changed dramatically when the jury included a black member who spoke in favor of the
death penalty for the defendant. Under these circumstances, white jurors favored the death
penalty for the black defendant more frequently than for the white defendant. See John F.
Dovidio et al., Racial Attitudes and the Death Penalty, 27 J. APP. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1468, 1480-
81 (1997). This study is consistent with the theory of aversive racism developed by Dovidio
and Gaertner. The students originally did not want to appear prejudiced so they imposed a
harsher judgment on the white defendant. But when a black juror favored the death penalty,
white jurors were free to act out their unconscious racism by imposing the death penalty more
frequently on the black defendant, maintaining their self-esteem and belief that they are not
racist. All of this "decision making" took place at an unconscious level. See id. at 1480-81.
66 See generally Katz et al., supra note 32.
67 The subjects were not really administering electric shocks, but they believed that they
were. See id. at 47.
68 See id. at 43-44.
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victims by denigrating the black victim even more than the white victim
shocked.
Katz, Wackenhutt and Glass interpreted their results slightly differ-
ently than did Dovidio and Gaertner. Whereas Katz and his colleagues
assume that the white subjects actually possess pro-black feelings that
conflict with their view of the Protestant work ethic, Dovidio and
Gaertner interpret their results to demonstrate that even liberal whites
possess strong unconscious anti-Black biases. In either case, however,
both groups of psychologists concluded that whites reacted to blacks dif-
ferently than to whites, unaware that they were doing so. 69
The research demonstrates that although negative stereotypes per-
sist, the personal beliefs of many individuals often conflict with the nega-
tive stereotype. 70 Personal beliefs of low prejudiced7' white individuals
tend to view blacks in a more positive light than the stereotype.72 Ironi-
cally, however, there is often a discrepancy between these individuals'
behavior and their personal beliefs.73 Unless the low prejudiced individu-
als have the time and the cognitive capacity necessary to engage in con-
trolled processing, they will most frequently unconsciously endorse the
stereotype.74 This discrepancy is attributed to the endurance of stereo-
types in memory, and the high accessibility of stereotypes for easy, auto-
matic unconscious retrieval.75 In Automaticity of Social Behaviors:
Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action,76
Professors Bargh, Chen and Burrows conclude that unconscious stereo-
types lead to automatic, unconscious behavior:
[S]ocial behavior can be triggered automatically by
features of the environment.... [T]he same trait-prim-
ing manipulations that have exerted a non-conscious in-
69 There is also some research that suggests that blacks, when placed in positions of
competition with whites, may experience stereotype threat, which in turn impedes the perform-
ance of blacks vis a vis whites. See Claudia M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat
and the Test Performance of Academically Successful African Americans, in THE BLACK-
WHrrE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, eds., 1998).
70 See Devine & Elliot, supra note 40, at 1146.
71 Psychologists use the terms "low prejudiced" and "high prejudiced" to apply to indi-
viduals depending on their scores on established attitudinal measures of prejudice. See Julia R.
Zuwerink et al., Prejudice Toward Blacks: With and Without Compunction? 18 BAsIc & AP-
PLmD Soc. PSYCHOL. 131, 132 (1996).
72 See Devine & Elliot, supra note 40, at 1146.
73 See, e.g., Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications
for Progress in Prejudice Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 469 (1993);
Margo J. Monteith et al., Self-Directed and Other-Directed Affect as a Consequence of Preju-
dice-Related Discrepancies, 64 J. PERSoNALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 198 (1993).
74 See Devine & Elliot supra note 40, at 1147.
75 See id. at 1146-48.
76 John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Con-
struct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONAL=IT & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996).
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fluence over social perceptual processes in previous
research were shown to produce traitlike behavior as
well.... [T]raitlike behavior is also produced via auto-
matic stereotype activation if that trait participates in the
stereotype. The major implications of the findings are,
first, the apparent degree to which social behavior occurs
unintentionally and without conscious involvement in
the production of that behavior. Second, the findings
point to the possibility that the automatic activation of
one's stereotypes of social groups, by the mere presence
of group features . . . can cause one to behave in line
with the stereotype without realizing it.77
Recognizing that stereotypic responses are automatic, unconscious,
and persistent, psychologists have begun to focus on experimenting with
methods of inhibiting the automatic stereotypic response by use of inten-
tional processes.78
Professors C. Neil Macrae, Galen Bodenhausen and Alan B. Milne
have demonstrated that heightened self-focus 79 of an evaluator whose
personal standards conflict with negative cultural stereotypes o will per-
mit the evaluator to inhibit the activation of the stereotype and to make
decisions based on his or her more egalitarian personal standards. 81
77 Id. at 242.
78 See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Reducing Intergroup Bias: Elements of Intergroup
Cooperation, 76 J. PERSONALrrY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 388 (1999); E. Ashby Plant & Patricia
G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONAL-
rry AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 811 (1998); C. Neil Macrae et al., Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts:
Self-Focus and the Regulation of Mental Life, 74 J. PERSONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578
(1998); John F. Dovidio et al., Intergroup Bias: Status, Differentiation, and a Common In-
Group Identity, 75 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 109 (1998); C. Neil Macrae et al., On
Resisting the Temptation for Simplification: Counterintentional Effects of Stereotype Suppres-
sion on Social Memory, 14 SociAL CoGNmoN 1 (1996).
79 In one experiment, for example, researchers heightened self-focus of participants by
placing a full length mirror on the wall as the participants answered questions about judging
persons according to the group they belong. The results demonstrated that the participants
who answered the questions with the mirror on the wall found stereotyping more objectionable
than the participants who did not have the mirror on the wall. See Macrae et al., Saying No to
Unwanted Thoughts, supra note 78, at 580. In a follow-up study, participants were shown a
picture of a construction worker and were asked to describe the person. Those who had their
self-focus heightened by presence of the mirror produced fewer stereotypical responses. See
id. at 581. Researchers concluded that the findings confirmed previous research "demonstrat-
ing that when self-focus is high, perceivers tend to behave in accordance with normative stan-
dards and principles, such as it is inappropriate to stereotype others." Id.
80 Their work demonstrated that self-focus of high prejudiced individuals whose personal
standards accorded with the stereotypes may have actually increased reliance on the stereo-
type. See id. at 586. Where the social norms are less stereotypical than conflicting personal
standards of a high prejudiced individual, it is unclear whether self-focus would increase reli-
ance on the more stereotypical personal standard. See id. at 586-587.
81 See Macrae et al., supra note 78, at 581 (1998).
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Thus, a heightened self-focus increased the efficiency of the perceiver to
regulate cognitive processing.82 Even more interesting is the research-
ers' ability to reduce the stereotypic response through subliminal cues
that heighten the self-focus of the perceiver outside of the perceiver's
conscious awareness. 83 MacRae, Bodenheiser and Milne proved across a
series of experiments that self-focus increases the efficiency of stereo-
type regulation and that the self-regulation of stereotypes can be acti-
vated automatically - without the perceiver's intent or awareness.84
Unfortunately, the studies also show that after exposure to a high self-
focus situation, subjects whose self-focus decreased produced a "rebound
effect," increasing reliance on stereotypes in making judgments. 85
Focusing on how motivation affects cognitive processing, Profes-
sors Plant and Devine have demonstrated that the source of the motiva-
tion will influence whether the evaluator is able to inhibit the activation
of the stereotype.86 For example, if the motivation of a white subject is
internal, caused by a personal standard or belief that blacks deserve equal
treatment to whites, knowledge that the evaluator is not acting consist-
ently with this belief but is relying on stereotypic information leads to
feelings of guilt and self-criticism. 87 If the motivation is an expectation
that is external to the evaluator, a failure to conform leads to a threatened
feeling.88 According to these researchers, whether the motivation is in-
ternal or external will likely affect the ability and/or the motivation of the
subject to inhibit the resort to stereotypes. 89 Persons who are made
aware that their judgments, in violation of their personal standards, are
unconsciously based on stereotypes, may be more motivated to make a
conscious attempt to inhibit the activation of stereotypes.
This research is important to the understanding of how to prevent
the reliance on stereotypes in workplace situations. Although researchers
have not yet applied all of the research to the workplace and have not yet
82 See id.
83 To do this researchers placed a short subliminal cue on a video screen that included
the person's name. The control group's subliminal cue included the names of other persons,
not those of the subject. They observed that the subject whose name was subliminally
presented on the screen described the person to be judged in less stereotypical terms than did
the control group. Researchers concluded that self-focus can be automatically and uncon-
sciously stimulated and will still result in increased inhibition of the stereotype. See id. at 582-
583.
84 See id. at 587.
85 See id. at 584-586; see also C. Neil Macrae et al. Out of Mind But Back in Sight:
Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PaRsoNAnr & Soc. PsYCnOL. 808, 813-816 (1994)
(describing the "rebound effect" caused by inhibiting activation of stereotypes).
86 See generally, E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internal and External Motivation
to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1998).
87 See id. at 823.
88 See id. at 825.
89 See id. at 825-26.
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solved the "rebound effect," this work clearly demonstrates the persis-
tence of unconscious stereotyping in evaluating group members, but it
also provides hope that stereotyping is not inevitable.
As Professors Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson and Howard
state:
The work of Devine suggests that implicit prejudice
is like a 'bad habit.' It is an overleamed response that
can be unlearned. An important first step is making peo-
ple aware of discrepancies between their conscious ide-
als and automatic negative responses. By making these
nonconscious negative responses conscious, it may be
possible to take advantage of the genuinely good inten-
tions of aversive racists to motivate them to gain the ex-
periences they need to unlearn one set of responses and
learn the new set that they desire.***
Although implicit negative racial attitudes among
Whites may be generally unconscious and automatic,
these responses are not inevitable.90
Sociological research also supports the conclusion that whites are
often unaware of their biases and prejudices toward blacks. In White
Women, Race Matters: The Social Construct of Gender,91 Dr. Ruth
Frankenburg describes a sociological study in which she extensively in-
terviewed thirty white women, ages twenty to ninety-three. 92 She found
that white women, although describing themselves as feminists, were un-
aware of the importance of race in their lives.93 They tended to think of
whiteness as the norm, and saw racism as a distant phenomenon for
which they bore no responsibility. Although they did not want to be
identified as racist, they harbored racist fears and stereotypes.94
In Shaping the Organizational Context for Black Inclusion,95 social
psychologists Pettigrew and Martin discuss the problems African-Ameri-
cans face at the recruitment, entry and promotional stages of employ-
ment. According to the authors, the problems arise from two sources: the
structure of the situations themselves and overt and unconscious anti-
black prejudices. 96 According to Pettigrew and Martin, biased and
90 John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled
Processes, 33 J. EXPERmENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 510, 535-536 (1997).
91 See generally RutH FRANKENBERG, WHinr WOMEN, RACE MATrERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHIENEss (1993).
92 See id. at 25.
93 See id. at 46-47.
94 See id. at 39, 54, 55, 77, 81, 83, 88.
95 See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational Context for
Black American Inclusion, 43 J. Soc. Issuas 41 (1987).
96 See id. at 41-43.
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stressful interviews 97 can cause ambivalence in blacks toward the job.98
Once hired, blacks will often suffer from exaggerated job expectations
and extreme evaluations, triggered by cognitive biases. 99 These occur in
three forms: racial stereotyping, the "solo" role, and the token role of the
"presumedly 'incompetent' affirmative action employee."'1 Blacks who
enter organizations are often found in the solo role. When in "solo" roles
they usually encounter low expectations which can affect their self-worth
and future performance.' 0 ' Experiments show that solos tend to be
judged as having a stronger presence than non-solos engaged in the same
organizational behavior.'0 2 More importantly, a contribution made by a
solo is judged as less creative and effective than the same contribution
made by a non-solo.'0 3 At times, however, the solo is greeted with ex-
traordinarily high expectations. If the solo lives up to the expectations,
the good evaluations follow. The solo, however, runs into trouble if his
or her work runs to average. 1 4
A third problem is the "token" problem. Pettigrew defines a token
as a person who has gotten the job merely through affirmative actions
efforts. Others surrounding the "token" will presume him to be incompe-
tent and that he got the job only through preferential treatment. 105
Professor Pettigrew recommends macro as well as micro changes to
improve the workplace for black workers. The key problem is the small
numbers of blacks in the workplace, leading to their solo and token sta-
tuses. Pettigrew recommends hiring a critical mass of minorities. 10 6 An
"accumulation of members of a variety of minority groups"'01 7 with only
a few representatives of each, according to Pettigrew, does not work. To
combat tokenism and soloism, there must be a critical mass of any given
minority group.' 08 Even when blacks are scarce in the organization, Pet-
97 Experiments demonstrate that whites who interview both blacks and whites will re-
spond much differently to the black candidate than to the white candidate. See id. at 53. Black
applicants received less eye contact, less forward body lean and shorter interviews and the
white interviewers sat further away from the black applicants. Interestingly, when faced with
similar interview conditions in another experiment, white applicants performed significantly
worse than white applicants who had been faced with a "friendly" or "high immediacy" inter-
view. See id. at 54. Thus, it appears that unconscious behaviors of the interviewer can affect
the performance of the interviewee.
98 See id. at 43.
99 See id.
100 See id. at 43.
101 See id. at 55-56.
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 56-57.
105 See id. at 57-58.
106 See id. at 71.
107 Id.
108 See id.
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tigrew recommends they be clustered with caution not to create low-
status.109
B. GENDER DATA
Social science researchers have examined prevalent attitudes toward
women and how they affect women in the workplace. In Why So Slow?:
The Advancement of Women, 110 Professor Virgina Valian analyzes and
synthesizes the results of these studies."' She explains that "gender
schemas" are responsible for undervaluation of women in the work-
place. 112 She defines "schema" as:
a mental construct that, as the name suggests, contains in
schematic or abbreviated form someone's concept about
an individual or event, or a group of people or events. It
includes the person's or group's main characteristics,
from the perceiver's point of view and the relationship
among those features .... The term schema is broader
and more neutral than the term stereotype which tends to
connote an inaccurate and negative view of a social
group. Schemas may be accurate or inaccurate, and they
may be positive, negative, or neutral.1 13
As Professor Valian explains, although sometimes inaccurate,
schemas are a "cognitive necessity" for persons to survive in the world,
permitting us to process information quickly, to recognize people at a
glance, to perceive and categorize persons we have just met, and to pre-
dict others' future actions. 114
The schemas that are most relevant to perceptions of the profes-
sional competence of women and men are role schemas which predict
the role a person plays professionally, in the family, or in society in gen-
eral. 115 If someone's actions contradict the schema, the holder of the
schema either ignores the contradictory evidence or attributes the differ-
ence to an exception. 116 By doing this, the holder of the schema main-
tains the schema and does not re-examine its validity. 117
109 See id.
110 VmGnA VALiAN, WHY So SLOW?: THE ADVANCEMENT OF W oMEN (1998).
111 For a thorough discussion of the psychological research on gender stereotyping, see
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167) (listing extensive psychological research on sex
stereotyping).
112 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 303.
113 l at 103-4.
114 See id. at 104.
115 See id.
116 See id. at 105-6.
117 See id.
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The origin of gender schemas is unclear.' 18 However, there is wide-
spread agreement among psychologists that they unconsciously affect
how employers evaluate women's work. 119
There are scores of studies supporting this proposition.' 20 One
study conducted in 1973 demonstrates that male managers rated men as
having more of the characteristics of successful managers than wo-
men. 21 Even more telling, this same study repeated in 1989 produced
the same results. 122 A recent study by Professor Martha Foschi uses "ex-
pectation theory" to demonstrate that male group members evaluate wo-
men as less competent than equally competent men. Foshi terms this the
"double standard" which can be a "subtle mechanism through which the
status quo can be maintained."' 23
In another study, fictitious summaries of resumes of PhD's in Psy-
chology were circulated to heads of Psychology departments who were
asked at what rank the professors should be hired. Some of the resumes
had women's names and others had men's. The resumes of the men
were ranked at the associate professor level whereas the same resumes
with women's names on them were ranked at the assistant professor
level. 124 A recent empirical study appearing in the Columbia Law Re-
118 Observable sex differences could cause gender schemas, could be created by the
schemas or, more likely, there could be an interaction between the two. See id. at 112. Some
scientists believe that gender schemas originated in order to rationalize the sexual division of
labor. See Curt Hoffman & Nancy Hurst, Gender Stereotypes: Perception or Rationalization?,
58 J. PERSONALrrY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 197, 199, 206-207 (1990). Dr. Valian hypothesizes that
the role of mother causes cognitive groupings that do not divide the roles of physical and
psychological nurturing. Thus, women are responsible, because of their biological physical
nurturing role, for nurturing that goes well beyond the physical. This cognitive grouping is
actually a mistake, according to Dr. Valian, but one that, absent informative data, humans
would be bound to repeat. See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 116-118.
119 See VALIr , supra note 110, at 126-44.
120 Although I have read these studies independently, I owe Dr. Valian the credit for
finding these studies for me. See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 126-44.
121 See Madeline E. Heilman et aL, Has Anything Changed? Current Characterizations of
Men, Women and Managers, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 935, 939 (1989); see also Paul R. Sack-
ett et al., Tokenism in Performance Evaluation: The Effects of Work Group Representation on
Male-Female and White-Black Dfferences in Performance Ratings, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
263(1973) (examining ratings in a wide variety of jobs and industries).
122 Professor Heilman's study included an additional question in the 1989 study. She had
the subjects compare male managers and female managers with the requirements for being a
good manager and found that although a significant and troubling difference still existed be-
tween the perception of male and female managers, the difference was reduced. Unfortu-
nately, however, women managers were still rated as having fewer of the skills and personal
requirements necessary to be a good manager. See Heilman, supra note 121, at 939-941.
123 Martha Foschi et al., Gender and Double Standards in Assessment of Job Applicants,
57 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 326, 337 (1994).
124 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 127-129 (citing L.S. Fidell, Empirical Verification of
Sex Discrimination in Hiring Practices in Psychology in WoMAN: DEPENDENT OR INDEPEND-
ENT VARIABLE? 774-782 (R.K. Unger & F.L. Denmark, eds., 1975)).
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view confirms these results with respect to law school hiring. 125 Law
professor Deborah Jones Merritt and sociologist Dr. Barbara Reskin, us-
ing multiple regression analysis, 126 found that there exists a significant
gender bias in favor of males in course assignment and rank. Male law
professors teach more high status courses, such as constitutional law, 127
and receive initial appointments at higher ranks than equally qualified
women. 12 8 Just this year, Charles M. Vest, President of the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology, revealed that decades of discrimination
against senior women faculty, although unconscious, have had a deleteri-
ous effect on women at the institution. 129
In Gender Gaps: Who Needs To Be Explained?30 Professors
Miller, Taylor and Buck may help explain the persistence of stereotypes
and their potential harm when directed at women. They observe a ten-
dency to consider males and male traits the "norm" in all situations other
than those in which women predominate.' 3 ' Thus, men are considered to
be the "norm" in voting patterns, as well as in professions where there
are fewer women than men. Seeing men as the "norm" leads to the need
to explain why women deviate from the "norm," a tendency which in
turn stigmatizes women as "the other".' 3 2
Gender stereotyping also contributes to sex-segregated work-
places. 133 Because work that is considered to be predominately for wo-
men or minorities is less valued and lower paid, sex and race segregation
contributes significantly to inequities in the workplace. 34
Studies also show that women in positions of leadership receive
more negative responses for assertiveness than men do, even from per-
125 See generally Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Creden-
tials: The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199
(1997).
126 Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique that allows the expert to study
the influence of more than one factor on a result. Its use has been accepted in the employment
discrimination context. See MicHAEI J. ZNIMER Er AL., supra note 1, at 293-298.
127 See Merritt & Reskin, supra note 125, at 275.
128 See id. at 274.
129 See A Study on the Status of Women Faculty in Science, at MIT, Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology 2 (1999) (unpublished study on file with the author).
130 See Dale T. Miller et al., Gender Gaps: Who Needs To Be Explained?, 61 J. PaRSON.
ALrTY AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 5 (1991).
131 See id. at 11.
132 See id.
133 See Barbara F. Reskin & Irene Padavic, Supervisors as Gatekeepers: Male Supervi-
sors' Response to Women's Integration In Plant Jobs, 35 Soc. PROBs 536, 537 (1988).
134 See Barbara F. Reskin & Irene Padavic, Sex, Race, and Ethnic Inequality in United
States Workplaces, in HANDBOOK OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 343 (Janet Chafetz ed.,
1999).
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sons who believe in equality of the sexes.1 35 Women receive less atten-
tion for the same idea expressed the same way as men.' 36 Women who
are very assertive are viewed particularly negatively. 137 As Dr. Valian
summarizes:
When women attempt to be leaders they lose, rela-
tive to men, in three steps. First, they are attended to
less; they have more difficulty than men do in gaining
and keeping the floor. Second, when women do speak
and behave like leaders, they receive negative reactions
from their cohorts, even when the content and manner of
their presentations are identical to men's. Men are en-
couraged to be leaders by the reactions of those around
them, and women are discouraged from being leaders by
the reactions of those same people. Third, even observ-
ers with no overt bias are affected by negative reactions
to women leaders and tend to go along with the group
judgment.' 38
In Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female Leaders: Impli-
cations for Leadership Evaluations,139 Professors Butler and Geis found
that identical behavior of speaking at a meeting will engender different
reactions depending on whether the speaker is a woman or a man. Wo-
men who speak at mixed-gender meetings receive more negative non-
verbal cues than do men.140 These non-verbal, visible responses can oc-
cur automatically "without conscious awareness" of the person providing
the cue.' 4 ' According to Butler and Geis, the study:
supports a more social interpretation of the devaluation
of female leaders than earlier ones based on private bias.
It does not diminish the importance of private stereo-
types; rather, it provides evidence for their translation
into affect cues that serve as a social-situational mecha-
nism capable of arbitrarily raising or lowering the per-
ceived value of identical performances. If affect cues
serve as a nonverbal communication of group consensus
about the quality of a contribution, they could create or
135 See Dore Butler & Florence L. Gels, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 48
(1990).
136 See VALtAN, supra note 110, at 131.
137 See Alice H. Eagly et al., Gender and the Evaluation of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis,
111 PSYCHOL. BuLL. 3, 16-18 (1992).
138 VAtiMAN, supra note 110, at 131-32.
139 See Butler & Geis, supra note 135.
140 See id. at 54.
141 See id. at 57.
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eliminate biased evaluations regardless of evaluators'
private biases. This would create a self-fulfilling proph-
ecy. Biased expectations of the majority cause the be-
havior affective responses, which then produce the
differential evaluations of men's and women's contribu-
tions to support the initial expectations.1 42
Women experience a double bind. If they are viewed as masculine,
they will be perceived negatively even if the job calls for "masculine"
characteristics. 143 On the other hand, if they are perceived as too femi-
nine, they are viewed as less competent. This was exactly the bind ex-
perienced by Ann Hopkins in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.144 Hopkins,
a brilliant accountant and business-getter, was perceived as too mascu-
line and was counseled by her mentor to dress and act in a more feminine
way.' 45 The Court held that this perception should not govern the firm's
decision as to her candidacy for partnership.
Ironically, had Ann Hopkins been viewed as too feminine and at-
tractive, she would likely have been judged less competent, even though
she may have been welcomed into the partnership. Studies demonstrate
that attractive men are viewed as more competent than unattractive men
whereas women who are more attractive are considered less competent
than unattractive women. 146 But, there is a twist. Even though a more
attractive woman is viewed as less competent, men in positions of power
may give attractive women special consideration because men like to be
surrounded by attractive women.' 47
In Gender Trials,148 sociology professor Jennifer Pierce examines
the relationship between men and women working as lawyers and parale-
gals in a large law firm and in the legal department of a large corpora-
tion. Professor Pierce found that women are expected to engage in a
much larger percentage of emotional labor than men. Women paralegals,
for example, were expected to act deferentially to the lawyers and to take
care of them, much as the traditional wife is expected to act. 149 Male
lawyers treated their female paralegals as "interruptible"'i5 0 and "invisi-
142 Id. at 55.
143 See VALUAN, supra note 110, at 136.
144 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
145 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (citing 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.
1985)).
146 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 137-38; Madeleine E. Heilman & Melanie H. Stopek,
Attractiveness and Corporate Success: Different Causal Attributions for Males and Fentales,
70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 379, 385-87 (1985).
147 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 138.
148 JENNIFER L. PIERCE, GENDER TRAALS: EMOTIONAL LIVES IN CONTEMPORARY LAW
FiRMs (1995).
149 See id. at 89-102.
150 Id. at 95-96.
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ble."'151 They expected female paralegals uncritically to absorb the law-
yer's criticism and aggressive behavior without complaining, without
demonstrating anger, all the while soothing him.152 Female paralegals
who broke with the established norm were sanctioned. 153 As Professor
Pierce states:
Paralegals are expected to utilize certain feminized com-
ponents of emotional labor: deference and caretaking.
These emotional requirements reflect the traditional
roles of wife and mother. Much like the traditional wife
in relation to her husband, the paralegal defers to the at-
torney's authority and affirms his status by submitting to
and smoothing over his angry outbursts, being non-criti-
cal vis-a-vis his written work and professional habits,
submitting to constant interruptions, and being treated as
if she were invisible. And like the "perfect mother" who
tends to the needs of the family while suppressing her
own, the legal assistant is expected to be pleasant, cheer-
ful, and reassuring, to express gratitude to others for her
boss, and to serve as an arbiter of his feelings to others.
While many people of both sexes may harbor a "fantasy
of the perfect mother," what is distinctive here is that the
fantasy itself is embedded in the culture of working rela-
tions within law firms. It is male litigators who can ex-
pect to receive nurturing and support from women
paralegals and not the reverse. 154
Professor Pierce further notes that female and male paralegals are
treated differently and there are different expectations of them:
Being a paralegal is not the same job for men as it
is for women. Women, and not men, face a double bind
in selecting coping mechanisms. If they are nice, they
are overworked and unappreciated, but if they fail to be
nice, they are viewed as uncooperative. Men, on the
other hand, can get away with failing to be nice and can
pass themselves off as attorneys, thus utilizing the infor-
mal "old boys" network to their advantage. Also, men
'51 Id. at 96.
152 See id. at 90-93.
153 See id. at 93-94.
154 Id. at 102. Interestingly, female paralegals engage in coping strategies that resemble
those of wives. Professor Pierce found that paralegals employ one or more of the following
strategies: (1) infantilization of the attorney; (2) personalizing their relationships with the attor-
ney; (3) being "nice"; (4) defining oneself as "occupationally transient;" and (5) rationalizing
one's career goals and lifestyle choices. See id. at 161.
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could luxuriate in the privilege of defining themselves as
occupationally transient and free from familial obliga-
tions. And finally, by virtue of being male they can and
must distance themselves from the paralegal role.155
Male and female lawyers in law firms also have very different jobs.
Pierce states:
In litigation, women lawyers face a number of obstacles
that render it more difficult for them to be successful in
their profession, while male paralegals luxuriate in 'spe-
cial' treatment. Women litigators, as token members of
the legal profession, are excluded from the old-boy net-
work, making it more difficult for them to bring clients
into firms. They are subjected to sexual harassment and
receive no institutional forms of support to aid the bal-
ance between family and career. They also encounter a
constant double-bind in the performance of emotional la-
bor - if they are intimidating and aggressive, they are
dismissed as 'shrill' and 'unladylike,' but if they are not
aggressive, they are considered not tough enough to be
good litigators. By contrast, male paralegals as token
members of a feminized occupation simply do not en-
counter these problems and instead accrue a number of
advantages by virtue of being male. They are assumed
to be more qualified than female paralegals for positions
of authority within their occupation and in fact are con-
sidered more intelligent, simply because they are men.
Because their male status gives them the privilege of so-
cializing informally with male attorneys, they are able to
obtain more interesting work assignments as well as per-
sonal recognition and affirmation for their work. And
finally, as men they are able to get away with doing dif-
ferent kinds of emotional labor than women paralegals
do (e.g., playing the role of "political advisor" rather
than nurturing mother).156
In her groundbreaking work on male behavior in the workplace,
Professor Patricia Martin observes that men "mobilize masculinities" in
their evaluation of women (and men) at work. 157 Professor Martin iden-
155 Id. at 175.
156 Id. at 176-77.
157 See Patricia Y. Martin, Gendering and Evaluating Dynamics: Men, Mascudinities, and
Managements, in MEN As MANAGERS, MANAGERS As MEN 186, 190 (David L. Collinson &
Jeff Hearn eds., 1996).
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tifies a number of ways that men, perhaps unconsciously, establish and
maintain their dominance over equally qualified women in the workplace
by conflating masculinity with social relations at work and with work
performance. 158 Professor Martin identifies three gender-based evalua-
tional frames (or lenses) through which males evaluate female workers:
(1) potential; (2) legitimacy; and (3) performance. 159 For example, in
evaluating potential, male managers typically see women and men work-
ers as different. These frames, according to Professor Martin, are used
generally without the manager's awareness. Male managers tend to
judge men's talents and abilities as "more consonant with more valued
jobs and opportunities."' 160 With respect to legitimacy, men "framed wo-
men as lacking legitimacy to hold powerful positions."'161 This was ap-
parent, for example, when a group of men on a search committee for a
university president, missed the formal job presentation of the only wo-
man candidate, while attending the presentations of all of the male candi-
dates. This action was a public enactment of masculinity, according to
Martin, "declaring for all to see their assumption that men are better
(more important) than women."'162 Finally, men observe women's per-
formance through a "gender lens," frequently devaluing women's per-
formance relative to men's.' 63 Even when men evaluate women
positively, they still actively favor men by promoting them over
women.164
Martin's studies suggest that men have different interactive styles
than women that give them benefits women do not have. First, men are
self-promotional, a style that elevates not only the particular self-pro-
moter, but all men over women.' 65 Men, especially the younger ones,
ask for help from powerful supporters based on "need," whereas women
do not ask for help but expect to be treated fairly according to the merits
of their work. 166 Finally, because they see women's performance
through a gender-biased lens of which they are unaware, some men pub-
licly criticize women's performance, whereas women do not do the same
to men.167 According to Martin, "[M]en's interactional practice of dis-
paraging women at work demeans all women and places them in a defen-
158 See id. at 190.
159 See id. at 200-1.
160 Id. at 201.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 205.
163 See id. at 202.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 203.
166 See id.
167 See id. at 203-4.
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sive posture relative to the men who engage in such behavior and to
other women who, through this practice, are collectively devalued."168
Although Professor Martin does not suggest that all men act in this
fashion, "masculinist" behavior in the workplace is often invisible to
men, affects women's daily work lives and their long-term careers. Pro-
fessor Martin identifies four basic "masculinist" behaviors: "contesting
masculinities," "aligning masculinities," "ingroup and outgroup mascu-
linities" and "intersecting masculinities."' 69
"Contesting masculinities" according to Martin, are competitive ef-
forts between men to establish superior standing and/or resources.' 70
They include: (1) "peacocking," or vying for attention in official meet-
ings which tend to "exhaust" women and make them feel like outsid-
ers; 171 (2) self-promoting, or openly alleging one's superior skills or
talent, a form of "contesting" that many women are not comfortable do-
ing for themselves172; (3) dominating, or efforts to control others; and
(4) expropriating others' labor by using others' work to one's benefit or
by taking credit for the work of others.173
"Aligning masculinities" are behaviors men use to affiliate with
other men. They include visiting with other men in the halls and offices,
and at lunch, deferring to more powerful men, protecting other men from
the consequences of their incompetence or poor job performance, sup-
porting associates, decision making based on whom they like, and ex-
pressing affinity for other men by talking about sports or other types of
"male" activities at work.'7 4 "Ingroup masculinities" refer to men's be-
havior directed at other men, treating other men as insiders and women
as outsiders, confirming men's, but not women's, "membership in the
community of work."' 75 "Outgroup masculinities" are the opposite side
of the coin. They are behaviors directed at women only that confirm
their unequal status in the workplace.' 7 6 Professor Martin suggests that:
"[M]en's practice of ingroup masculinities structurally excludes women
168 Id.
169 Patricia Y. Martin, Men's Mobilization of Masculinities, at Work: From (Some) Wo-
men's Standpoints 27-35 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
170 See id. at 27.
171 See id. at 28.
172 See id. at 29.
173 See id. at 30-31.
174 See id. at 32-33. Many of these are the activities Professor Beiner describes as "rein-
deer games." See Theresa M. Beiner, Do Reindeer Games Count As Terms, Conditions or
Privileges of Employment Under Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REv. 643 (1996) (arguing that "rein-
deer games" alter terms and conditions of employment under Title VII).
175 Martin, supra note 169, at 34.
176 See id.
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by casting them as outsiders and audience, independent of both content
and intent." 177
Martin is careful to note that hers is a study of behaviors and effects,
not a study of the intentions of the men.178 She also notes that not all of
the actions of men at work enact masculinities, t79 but she does see a
demonstrable effect on the careers of women she has interviewed in her
research.1 80
The psychological and sociological research on women in the work-
place demonstrates that gender stereotyping and mobilizing masculini-
ties, of which male actors are unaware, persist as barriers to the equal
treatment and advancement of women in the workplace. Gender stere-
otyping apparently differs from race stereotyping in that it is ambivalent,
relying both on hostility and on benevolent attitudes toward women. 181
Both hostile and benign attitudes, however, are rooted in patriarchy
which establishes men as dominant and superior and women as weaker
and inferior.182 Hostility is directed at the woman who crosses gender
lines - the "career woman" or the "feminist."' 183 Benevolent attitudes are
directed at women in their traditional roles of mother, wife and
daughter.184
Although attitudes toward women may differ in type from attitudes
toward persons of color, the fact is that gendered behavior, whether be-
nevolent or hostile, whether conscious or unconscious, operates to deny
women opportunities in the workplace. Often, because these attitudes
are so ingrained in our culture, men may make decisions about women's
suitability in a particular job on the basis of stereotypes, unaware that
they are doing so.
At times, both men and women experience difficulties in perceiving
discrimination against women when it occurs. 185 This is especially diffi-
177 See id.
178 See id. at 34.
179 See Martin, supra note 157, at 205.
180 See id. at 205.
181 See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 21 PSYCHOL. OF
WOMEN Q. 119, 119-121 (1997).
182 See id. at 121-22.
183 See id. at 129.
184 See id.
185 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAUING OF SEX, 141 (1997). Professor Rhode recounts:
At a recent discussion of diversity in the legal profession, a prominent law school
dean expressed skepticism that the 'woman problem' remained a problem. Although
he was well aware of persistent issues involving racial and ethnic bias, he was sur-
prised to hear that some of those present also viewed gender inequality as a signifi-
cant concern. I was equally surprised by his surprise. Law, I noted, is no different
from other elite professional settings. Women are substantially underrepresented, at
the top and substantially overrepresented, at the bottom of status and reward struc-
tures. 'Really?' he asked. 'Are you sure?'
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cult when individual stories of women rather than the stories of groups of
women are told. 18 6 "Unconscious gender stereotypes ... prevent women
from breaking through the glass ceiling and... prevent men from seeing
that any glass ceiling exists." 187
Behavior that is either subtle or invisible to men and perhaps, even
to women, however, has profound effects on women's careers. 188
The research on unconscious biases, the conformity to gender ste-
reotypes and racially and sexually discriminatory behavior has gained
acceptance in the general scientific community. Psychologists have ac-
tively studied social stereotypes for over six decades. 189 For example, in
1954 Gordon Allport published his groundbreaking treatise, THE NATURE
OF PREJUDICE, stimulating scientific discovery in the areas of cognitive,
motivational and behavioral foundations of stereotyping. 190 Psycholo-
gists have performed this research conducting empirical studies using
valid research methods. The results and methodology have been scruti-
nized by critical peer review in the relevant scientific community and the
research has been published in respected scientific journals. The re-
search is externally valid because it has been repeatedly confirmed over
time in many different experiments. Thus, according to the American
Psychological Association, this research "satisfies the essential criteria
for general scientific acceptance."' 191 As Professor Dovidio states:
The issue of intentionality is fundamental to understand-
ing both the nature of contemporary prejudice and the
potential conflict between social scientific and legal evi-
dence. With respect to racial prejudice, much of the cur-
rent research on racial attitudes demonstrates (consistent
Id.
186 Faye J. Crosby et al., The Denial of Personal Disadvantage Among You, Me and All
the Other Ostriches, in GENDER AND THOUGHT: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 79 (Mary
Crawford and Margaret Gentry eds., 1989).
187 RHODE, supra note 185, at 145.
188 Martin, supra note 179, at 190-91, 205 (concluding that "mobilizing masculinities"
have a negative effect on women's careers and power in the workplace).
189 See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association In Support of Re-
spondent, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167). See, e.g., Katz &
Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 280 (1933).
190 See e.g., GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); Brief for Amicus
Curiae American Psychological Association In Support of Respondent, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167). The American Psychological Association re-
ports that in the psychological literature between 1967 and 1982 there were over 12,600 arti-
cles published on sex differences, over 3,600 on sex roles generally and almost 2,000 on sex
role attitudes specifically. From 1974 until 1987, there were over 1,500 articles published on
stereotypes. See id.
191 Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association In Support of Respon-
dent, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167).
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with a central proposition of the aversive racism frame-
work) that racial biases may be unconscious and thus
often occur unintentionally.***
Although bias may be subtle, its consequences can be
significant. From the perspective of the victims of bias,
the issue of whether bias is intentional may be secondary
to the fundamental issue of whether they are being
treated fairly by others and the legal system.***
Thus, to the degree that intentionality must be demon-
strated to prove discrimination legally, subtle and unin-
tentional forms of contemporary bias, such as aversive
racism, may continue to exist and persist in disadvantag-
ing Blacks relative to Whites insignificant ways. 192
The social science research above should play a key role in judicial
interpretation of Title VII. Limiting the definition of discriminatory acts
to those where the employer possesses a conscious intent to discriminate
because of an employee's race or gender ignores the vast scientific re-
search that was not present at the time of the passage of the Act. More-
over, since the nature of racist and sexist attitudes and behavior have
changed since 1964, continuing to define discrimination in an outdated
mode will underestimate by a large margin the number of racist and sex-
ist decisions.
Given the vast psychological and sociological evidence that uncon-
scious processes account for a great deal of discriminatory attitudes and
behavior, the courts and the Congress must recognize the evolution by
incorporating the powerful evidence demonstrating that racially and sex-
ually discriminatory behavior results from unconscious as well as con-
scious prejudice into the law and by explicitly broadening the definition
of "intentional" to include unconscious behavior.193 Although banishing
all forms of unintentional discrimination from the workplace is no simple
192 John J. Dovidio et al., Racial Attitudes and the Death Penalty, 27 J. APPL. Soc.
PSYCHOL., 1468, 1483 (1997).
193 See Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining Evaluations and Establishing
Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. Rv. 477, 516-517 (1986). This scientific evidence is
admissible under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to prove the unconscious nature
of discriminatory stereotyping on decision making. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
FED. R. Evro. 702.
The bulk of the scientific knowledge cited to above: (1) has been tested and subjected to
peer review; (2) has been published by peer reviewed journals; and (3) has gained general
acceptance in the scientific community. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U. S. 579, 593-594 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999).
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matter, in most areas of Title VII the proof constructs already exist that
make it possible to recognize as illegal at least some of the unconscious
discrimination that is responsible for unequal treatment of women and
minorities in the workplace. Through use of a hypothetical case, Lopez
v. Lowell Printing Co., Part II demonstrates that proof concepts origi-
nally designed to identify conscious discriminatory intent are also capa-
ble of holding employers liable for unconscious discrimination. Part II
also demonstrates a clear counter-evolution in Title VII law that narrows
the coverage of the Act.
II. DYNAMIC STATUTORY EVOLUTION AND RESPONSIVE
CRITIQUE: 194 DEVELOPMENT AND
INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII DOCTRINE
Soon after enactment of Title VII in 1964, there developed two
strands of discrimination law: disparate treatment and disparate impact.
According to the courts and commentators, disparate treatment theory
required a showing of conscious intent to discriminate, or, in other
words, a conscious discriminatory motive at the moment the employer
194 See WILLLAM F. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRErATION 69-80 (1994).
Professor Eskridge demonstrates that a statute is a living, dynamic entity, interpreted from the
"bottom up" rather than from the top down. Eskridge notes that the Supreme Court is not the
first body to interpret a statute after its enactment; in fact, a host of others interpret the law
before it reaches the Supreme Court, effectively shaping the law by determining which
questions to present to the Court and how to pose them. These "others" include individual
attorneys who advise their clients of their interpretation of the law, the administrative bodies
responsible for interpreting the law, and lower courts. Along the way, advocacy groups may
suggest arguments under the law, influencing the arguments lawyers make on behalf of their
clients.
Eskridge notes that at each stage of interpretation, the interpreter considers how the
proposed interpretation will fare at the next stage. See id. at 74-78. For example, an
administrative agency considers whether the courts will uphold its interpretation of the law.
The Supreme Court considers whether the legislature will overrule its interpretation by
amending the statute. See id.
A brief consideration of a few of the many variables considered by parties to a statute's
interpretation demonstrates the rich, complicated texture of the process of dynamic
interpretation. For example, the Supreme Court is aware that the legislature considering the
Court's interpretation differs in politics and composition from the original enacting body. The
Court also considers that in order to overrule the Court's interpretation, the legislature must
often overcome its institutional reluctance to write far-reaching legislation.
Politics play an important role in interpretations of statutes made by executive agencies as
well. As policy changes with newly appointed heads of agencies when new parties come into
power, such policy changes will affect the interpretation accorded to statutes within the
agency's area of expertise. See id. at 78-79.
Although the development of the disparate impact theory in Title VII is an example of
dynamic statutory interpretation, the evolution of the proof constructs in disparate treatment
cases, equaling "intent" with causation was silent and less obvious, perhaps unconscious itself
on the part of the courts. See id. at 24.
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made an employment decision.' 95 Courts use intent synonymously with
"motive," assuming that one's intent or motive for an employment deci-
sion is necessarily a conscious state of mind. Courts designed different
modes of proof to ascertain whether the employer had the requisite state
of mind at the time of the employment action. Disparate impact theory,
in contrast, did not require a showing of discriminatory intent. Rather,
the employer would be held liable for employing neutral employment
criteria having a disparate impact on racial minorities and/or women if
the employer could not prove that those criteria were business related
and necessary. 196
A closer examination of the different modes of proof under the dis-
parate treatment theory 197 will demonstrate that the courts' theoretical
justification for the disparate treatment modes of proof could not be sub-
stantiated. Indeed, while courts justified the modes of proof as a means
of determining which employers are guilty of conscious intentional dis-
crimination, the proof methods used to establish intent under the dispa-
rate treatment theory have one thing in common: they are all capable of
holding liable employers who have discriminated unconsciously as well
as those who have done so consciously.198 Before embarking on a de-
scription of the different modes of proof under Title VII, let us examine a
hypothetical case, Lopez v. Lowell Printing Co.
A. CASE STUDY: LopE;z v. LOWELL PImrNG Co.
Janet Lopez, a black woman, is discharged from her job at Lowell's
Printing Company. Lopez, who worked as the Assistant Manager of Pro-
duction for 15 years, consistently received good job evaluations from her
195 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) ('The critical inquiry...
is whether gender was a factor in the employment decision, at the moment it was made.").
196 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that an employer's
policies limiting jobs to persons with high school diploma or who have passed a standardized
test was illegal because it had a disparate impact on black applicants). This decision, while
focusing on the legislative purpose of eliminating discrimination, ignores the Humphrey
amendment that seems to clearly state that a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent in order
to prevail. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights: Toward a Coherent National Dis-
charge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L. J. 1443, 1464-1465 (1996). For a justification of Griggs, see
WILIAM N. ESKRJDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRErATION 24 (1994).
197 Although disparate impact theory is relevant to the definition of intent in disparate
treatment cases, this article will focus on disparate treatment theory, referring as necessary to
the disparate impact theory in footnotes.
198 This does not necessarily mean that this was in fact how they have been applied. As
this article demonstrates, while originally these constructs were applied to reach unconscious
discrimination, a change occurred leading to a narrower application of the constructs. A few
other scholars and courts have suggested that disparate treatment does not require a conscious
intent to discriminate but is more similar to a causation requirement. See, e.g., Selmi, supra
note 13, at 287-288; Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact
Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. Rav. 387, 408-409 (1996); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory
hztent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 935, 964-965 (1989).
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supervisor, Brandon Bop, a white male, and regular merit raises while
Bop was her supervisor. When Bop retired, William Snead, a white
male, replaced him.
After Snead began work, things changed for Lopez. Her annual
evaluation stated, "Could be more proactive. Does not solve problems
well. Doesn't get along with people." Snead rated Lopez's work as "un-
satisfactory" and wrote on the bottom of her report, "Janet continues to
have problems organizing production. She tends to be scattered, and her
fellow employees have trouble getting along with her." A few months
later, Snead called Lopez into his office to tell her that she was fired.
When Lopez asked Snead why he was firing her, he said, "It just hasn't
worked out. I'm sorry." A week later, the company hired John Randall,
a 25 year old white male friend of Snead's to take Ms. Lopez's job. Ms.
Lopez sues alleging that her employer illegally discriminated against her
under Title VII. Because Lopez' case is a disparate treatment case, she
must prove that Lowell intentionally discriminated against her because of
her race.
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT: PROVING INTENT
Disparate treatment comprises three distinct categories of cases gen-
erally defined by the methods of proof available: (1) direct vs. indirect
modes of proof; (2) individual vs. pattern and practice cases or class
actions; and (3) single motive vs. mixed motives cases.
Disparate treatment plaintiffs with direct evidence of the employer's
discriminatory motive generally prove their cases directly through the
employer's admission. For example, had Snead told Lopez, "I am firing
you because you are black and I don't like blacks," Lopez would have
direct proof of discriminatory intent: an admission by the decision maker
that his motive for the firing is illegal.
While this type of statement was not uncommon immediately after
the passage of the Act, because of employers' increased sophistication
today there are few cases where the employer directly admits his illegal
motive for the adverse employment decision. 199 Thus, plaintiffs have
resorted to proving discrimination through indirect evidence, using the
proof methodologies established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green,200 and clarified in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, et. al2 0'
and Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine.202 The McDonnell
199 See Selni, supra note 13, at 290, explaining that after passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 discrimination became subtler and overt racism was the exception rather than the rule.
200 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
201 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
202 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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Douglas v. Green/Burdine20 3 mode of proof was designed to provide an
indirect alternative to proving intentional discrimination.204
1. The Individual Cases: The Indirect Method: McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine-Hicks
a. Early Interpretation and Evolution
If Lopez sues for race discrimination under Title VII, because there
is no direct evidence of intent to discriminate on the basis of her race, she
will employ the proof method developed in McDonnell Douglas/Bur-
dine. The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine construct is a three stage method
of allocating plaintiff's burden of persuasion and production. 20 5
Under McDonnell Douglas, Lopez can make out a prima facie case
by proving that she is black, was fired from her job for which she was
203 Throughout this article I refer to the McDonnell Douglas or the McDonnell Douglas!
Burdine method of proof to refer to the method adopted by the Supreme Court to analyze
individual claims of disparate treatment under Title VII. McDonnell Douglas/Burdine estab-
lished a three-part framework for proving discrimination using the indirect method. Under
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, as traditionally applied, the plaintiff has the burden of proving a
prima facie case by demonstrating that she was a member of the protected class, she was
dismissed from her job, she was qualified for the job and she was replaced by someone not of
the protected class. This proof shifts the burden of production to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate reason for the firing. Once the defendant meets this burden of production, the bur-
den shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's articulated reason is pretextual.
Most courts originally held that under Burdine if the plaintiff proved that the reason is pretex-
tual, there arose a mandatory presumption that the employer had illegally discriminated against
the employee. See generally Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248
(1981); see also discussion infra re mandatory presumption, Part ll.B.l.b.
This methodology, which is explicated more fully infra in Part II.B.l.a, was modified by
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). This article refers to the new eviden-
tiary construct emerging from Hicks as the "Hicks" method of proof. The courts have inter-
preted Hicks in a number of ways. For these subsequent interpretations of the Hicks method,
see infra, Part ll.B.l.b. Subsequently, the Court clarified Hicks in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumb-
ing Products, Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). See infra Part II.B.I.c.
204 See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (explaining that, at the third stage of the inquiry, the
plaintiff can either prove intentional discrimination directly or indirectly "by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("IT]he entire purpose of the
McDonnell Douglas prima face case is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of
intentional discrimination is hard to come by.").
205 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
20001
HeinOnline -- 9 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y. 449 1999-2000
450 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:415
qualified 206 and was replaced by a white person.207 This showing would
shift the burden of production to the employer to articulate a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for the discharge. 20 8 The purpose of requiring
a defendant to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for the employment
decision was to "meet the plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a
legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with suffi-
cient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate pretext."20 9 Lowell Printing would offer the testimony of
Sam Snead that Lopez was disorganized and did not get along with other
employees. It would also introduce into evidence the annual evaluation
rating her as "unsatisfactory."
This testimony under Burdine would suffice to fulfill the defend-
ant's burden of production, shifting the burden of production back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason for the
discharge is pretextual. The ultimate burden of persuasion would always
remain with the plaintiff.
The plaintiff could meet her burden of proving pretext in one of two
ways: she could prove that the defendant's articulated reason for her dis-
charge was not true or that, even if true, it was not the real reason for her
discharge. In Burdine, the Court described the result:
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now must have
the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason for the employment decision. The burden now merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by per-
suading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explana-
tion is unworthy of credence.210
206 There is some disagreement as to what "qualified" means in the context of an em-
ployee who sues an employer for firing or demoting her. A number of courts interpret "quali-
fied" in this context to require a showing that the plaintiff was living up to the employer's
reasonable and legitimate expectations. See Kizer v. Children's Learning Ctr., 962 F. 2d 608,
611-12 (7' Cir. 1992) (stating that plaintiff must prove that she met the employer's reasonable
expectations in order to fulfill the "qualified" requirement of the prima facie case). For a
discussion of this requirement and its effect on summary judgment, see Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title
VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 203, 230-31 n.125 (1993).
207 Although replacement by a person who is not a member of the protected class is not
crucial, it is generally required unless there is other evidence raising an inference of discrimi-
nation. See Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157 (7" Cir. 1996) (holding that even
though a white worker was replaced by another white worker, the plaintiff could still make out
a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII.).
208 See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
209 Id. at 256.
210 Id. at 256.
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For example, in response to Lowell Printing's evidence, Lopez
could prove through documentary and testamentary evidence that she is
organized, proactive and easy to get along with. Under Burdine and its
progeny before St. Mary's Honor Center, proof that the defendant's ar-
ticulated reason for the discharge is not accurate would usually lead to
the conclusion that the employer is lying and that the lying is a screen for
intentional discrimination. 211
A second possible strategy for Lopez under Burdine would be to
agree that some or all of these statements are true, but to present compa-
rator evidence, i.e., evidence demonstrating that although whites pos-
sessed the same attitudes and work behaviors, the company did not
discharge them. Like the proof that the defendant's defenses were not
true, this comparator evidence is also used to prove pretext. Under Bur-
dine and its progeny, this evidence apparently raised an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the defendant intentionally discriminated against Lopez
when it fired her.
In Burdine, the Court justified the McDonnell Douglas scheme by
reaffirming its presumption that generally employers act in a rational
fashion absent discrimination.212 The Court explained that the prima fa-
cie case eliminated the two most common non-discriminatory reasons for
a failure to hire: the lack of a job and the candidate's lack of qualifica-
tions for the job.213 The prima facie case, once established, raises a re-
buttable inference of discrimination that shifts the burden of production
to the defendant. 214 The defendant meets its burden by producing evi-
dence that the employer did not hire the plaintiff for a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason.215 This articulation serves an important function
of narrowing the factual inquiry, permitting the plaintiff to meet its bur-
den of proving that the defendant's reason for its behavior was discrimi-
natory. 216 Under Burdine, most courts of appeal held that a plaintiff's
proof that the reason articulated by the employer was pretextual was suf-
ficient to prove that the employer's act was discriminatory.217 The
courts reached this conclusion by combining the evidence supporting the
initial prima facie case with the assumption that employers act rationally.
Once'all legitimate reasons are eliminated for the employment decision,
then, the Court concluded, an illegitimate reason must have driven the
211 See Chippolini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F. 2d 893, 898 (3 d Cir. 1987).
212 See 450 U.S. at 254 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978)).
213 Id. at 254.
214 See id. at 254-55.
215 See id.
216 See id. at 255-56.
217 See id. at 256; see also Lanctot, supra note 2, at 65.
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decision. Justice Rehnquist had earlier explained the theoretical basis for
this reasoning in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters:218
[We are willing to presume [that unexplained acts are
more likely the result of consideration of impermissible
factors] largely because we know from our experience
that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without underlying reasons, especially
in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons
for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possi-
ble reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely
than not the employer, who we generally assume acts
only with some reason, based his decision on an imper-
missible consideration such as race.219
Initially, many lower courts interpreted Burdine to require the court
to enter judgment for the plaintiff once the factfinder found that the de-
fendant's articulated non-discriminatory reason for its employment ac-
tion was pretextual. 220 Their justification was that the plaintiffs prima
facie case raised a presumption of discrimination unless rebutted by the
defendant's articulation of a non-discriminatory reason for its actions.
Once the defendant articulated a non-discriminatory reason, the pre-
sumption of discrimination dropped from the case. If however, the plain-
tiff disproved the veracity of the defendant's articulated reason, the
presumption created by the plaintiffs prima facie case was resurrected
and the plaintiff was entitled to prevail. 221 I will term the requirement
that the plaintiff prevail upon proving that the defendant's reason is un-
worthy of credence the Burdine mandatory presumption.
There eventually grew, however, a number of courts rejecting the
mandatory presumption. This rejection resulted, in large part, because
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine rested on a faulty assumption. In Burdine,
the Court wrongfully assumes that the employer is deliberately lying if
the plaintiff proves that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse
employment action is pretextual. 222 This assumption is faulty because
218 See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
219 Id.
220 See, e.g., Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Tex. 1988)
(concluding that in Title VII case alleging national origin discrimination, the plaintiff wins
upon showing that the defendant's "articulated non-discriminatory reason" is unworthy of
belief).
221 See id. For a discussion of the "resurrection rationale" and other rationales for a
mandatory presumption, see Lanctot, supra note 2, at 107-11.
222 Even the word "pretext" appears to assume a conscious decision by the employer to
hide the truth, but courts originally interpreted any showing that the reason given by the em-
ployer was not the real reason for the decision as pretextual. Courts seemed to have ignored
the possibility that someone could give a pretextual reason unaware that it was not the real
reason for the decision.
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employers who make discriminatory decisions are not always aware that
their decisions are rooted in discrimination.223 As Part I's explanation of
contemporary psychological theory demonstrates, this underlying as-
sumption is not accurate.224
Further examination of the Lopez hypothetical will demonstrate this
point. A finding of pretext in Lopez will result from a number of possi-
ble factual variations and employer states of mind. Consider the follow-
ing seven plausible explanations of the discharge:
CASE ONE
Snead225 dislikes African Americans and does not want to work
with them. He knew that Lopez was not disorganized and was able to
get along with others, but consciously created a pretext to cover up race
discrimination.
CASE Two
Snead does not consciously dislike African Americans. He knew
.that Lopez was not disorganized and was able to get along with others,
but consciously created a pretext to cover up some other illegal or legal
reason for the dismissal. Snead could have used this coverup so that he
could hire his friend, John Randall, with whom Snead feels more com-
fortable working.
CASE THREE
Snead honestly but mistakenly believed that Lopez was disorganized
and unable to get along with others and he fired her as a result of this
mistaken belief.
CASE FouR
Although Lopez was disorganized and/or unable to get along with
others, Snead did not fire her for these reasons. Rather, Snead would
rather work with whites and he consciously dismissed her because of her
race.
CASE FIVE
223 See supra Part I for a discussion of contemporary psychological theory on the nature
and causes of discriminatory attitudes and behaviors.
224 Moreover, even if an employer is lying, he or she may have an incentive to lie about a
decision that is not necessarily discriminatory under Title VII. For example, if the employer
fired an employee in order to make room for his lover in the corporation, or because he dis-
agreed with the employee's politics, neither of these decisions would be illegal under a tradi-
tional analysis of Title VII law that requires a conscious intent to discriminate based on the
protected characteristic of the employee. Ironically, although courts clearly state this conclu-
sion repeatedly, the McDonnell Douglas construct as originally interpreted would permit the
factfinder to hold an employer liable for unconscious discrimination.
225 Under Title VII, the employer is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . , and any agent of such a person," 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(1994).
Because Snead is the agent of Lowell's Printing Company, his actions constitute those of
the employer for purposes of a lawsuit against the company.
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Although Lopez was disorganized and/or unable to get along with
others, Snead did not fire her for these reasons. Rather, Snead con-
sciously dismissed her for some other reason that he did not want to
reveal to the factfinder.
CASE SIX
Although Lopez was disorganized, Snead consciously treated Lopez
differently from whites with similar organizational failures because of her
race.
CASE SEVEN
Although Lopez' disorganization was similar to the failures of white
employees, Snead honestly but mistakenly believed that her failures were
worse than those of the white employees and that the difference justified
the differential treatment.2 26
An examination of Cases One through Seven in Lopez v. Lowell
Printing demonstrates that the mandatory presumption of McDonnell
Douglas holds liable employer action that has its origins in unconscious
prejudice. In Cases One through Seven, a factfinder could find that the
employer's articulated reason for Lopez' firing is pretextual, either be-
cause the reason itself is not true or because the factfinder does not be-
lieve that it is the real reason for the firing. Because many courts
interpreted Burdine to create a mandatory presumption of illegal discrim-
ination based on a finding of pretext, 227 an employer would be liable in
Cases One through Seven, even though the employer entertained a con-
scious motive to discriminate on the basis of Lopez' race in Cases One,
Four and Six only.
The Court's stated rationale for the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine
construct anticipated the possible findings in Cases One, Four and Six,
attributing the incongruence between the articulated reason and the fac-
tual finding to the defendant's dishonesty. Thus, according to this view,
the defendant's lie must be covering up the real reason for the employ-
ment decision: conscious illegal intentional discrimination. The Court's
reasoning in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny did not, however, an-
ticipate the Second, Third, Fifth or Seventh cases.2 28
226 As we have seen in Part I supra, this belief could result from mistaken cognitive
categorization, combined with a need to justify the employer's actions and ambivalence to-
ward blacks.
227 This interpretation changed in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
See discussion infra Part II.B.l.(b).
228 The Lopez case study provides another example of a "non-discriminatory" reason for
firing the plaintiff that may be based in racial prejudice. Snead could have decided that he
would prefer to work with his 25 year-old crony, John Randall, a white male. Although
Snead's decision may not represent invidious animus toward Lopez, his preference tracks a
natural tendency to associate with persons of like race. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging
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Thus, it appears, the courts employing McDonnell Douglas gener-
ally believed that the finding of pretext cast a narrower net than it did: it
actually went beyond identifying the employers who had consciously in-
tended to discriminate, potentially creating liability for employers who
lied about "non-discriminatory" reasons for employment decisions and
for employers whose employment decisions resulted from their uncon-
scious prejudice against their employees. 22 9
b. The Counter-Evolution Spawned by Hicks
Perhaps because courts intuitively, but unconsciously, knew that
McDonnell Douglas was capable of reaching beyond consciously dis-
criminatory behavior, some circuit courts of appeal questioned whether a
finding of pretext mandated a finding of discrimination.230 By the early
1990's there were at least two views regarding the effect of a showing of
pretext.231 Some maintained the mandatory presumption. These are
termed the "pretext only" courts.232 Others concluded that a finding of
pretext alone was insufficient for a finding of discrimination. These
were entitled the "pretext-plus" courts.233
The Supreme Court decided St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks234 in
response to this split. Melvin Hicks, a black male, was a security guard
at the defendant halfway house operated by the Missouri Department of
Corrections. Hicks had performed his job satisfactorily, but after a new
Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between
Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. Ray. 1003,
1024 n.132 (1997) [hereinafter McGinley, Cronyism]. This tendency offends the principles of
Title VII particularly when a black woman is fired in order to make room for a white male.
Because white males traditionally have the power in employment relations, permission to use
cronyism as a decision-making technique will generally operate to benefit white males and
harm persons of color. See id. at 1025 n.136. At the very least, the statute should uphold the
"merit principle," not permitting an employer to replace an equally or better qualified black
employee with a white applicant. See id. at 1011-1117.
229 This is not to say that there were no opportunities under McDonnell Douglas to exon-
erate an employer who consciously or unconsciously made a race-based decision. If an em-
ployer honestly believes that his employment decision is not rooted in discrimination or even if
it is and he is a convincing witness, the factfinder may conclude that there was no discrimina-
tory decision. An employer is most successful in this enterprise by keeping records of the
employee's failures.
230 See Lanctot, supra note 2, at 65-67, explaining the conflict among the circuits and
even within certain circuits.
Courts also grant summary judgment liberally, and arguably, inappropriately, perhaps for
the same reason. See generally, McGinley, Credulous Courts, supra note 2.
231 See Lanctot, supra note 2, at 65-67, describing the "pretext-only" and "pretext plus"
methods of viewing Burdine.
232 See, e.g., Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3"' Cir.) (en banc), cert.
dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Lanctot, supra note 2, at 65-67.
233 See, e.g., Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 901 F.2d 186, 191 (1 Cir. 1990);
Lanctot, supra note 2, at 65-67.
234 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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supervisor was assigned, Hicks "became the subject of repeated, and in-
creasingly severe, disciplinary actions" 235 which eventually led to his
dismissal. At trial before the federal district court as factfinder, St.
Mary's argued that it fired Hicks because he had violated rules. The
district court found that this reason for Hicks' dismissal was pretextual
because the employer had "either disregarded or treated more leni-
ently"236 similar or worse violations by Hicks' white counterparts. 237
The district court, however, refused to enter judgment for Hicks, because
the plaintiff had not proven that the "crusade to terminate [Hicks] ...
was racially rather than personally motivated. ' 238 The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court, ordering it to enter judg-
ment in Hicks' favor, relying on the Burdine statement quoted above that
once pretext is proven, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment.239
Taking a middle-ground between the pretext-only and pretext-plus
courts, the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeals' determina-
tion that a finding of pretext mandated judgment for the plaintiff, con-
cluding that although the factfinder could make an ultimate
determination of discrimination upon a finding of pretext, it was not re-
quired to do so. 240 Justice Scalia's opinion states:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by
the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by
a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's prof-
fered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, and the Court
of Appeals was correct when it noted that, upon such
rejection, '[n]o additional proof of discrimination is
required... *241
Although this language clearly states that evidence from which a
reasonable jury can conclude that the employer's articulated reason for
its employment decision "may, together with the elements of the prima
235 Id. at 505.
236 Id. at 508 (citing 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1250-51 (E.D. Mo. 1991)).
237 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508.
238 Id. (citing 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Mo. 1991)).
239 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 508 (citing 970 F.2d 487, 492 (8' Cir. 1992)).
240 I have criticized Hicks in other articles and will not repeat myself here. See Ann C.
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will: Toward a Coherent National
Discharge Policy, 57 OHIo ST. L. J. 1443 (1996) [hereinafter McGinley, Rethinking Civil
Rights]; McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 228, at 1019-1022. Suffice it to say, Hicks appears
to be a disingenuous opinion because it mischaracterized the Burdine language and holding,
and permits the factfinder to reach conclusions based on evidence that is not in the record.
241 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
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facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination," 242 strongly imply-
ing that such evidence should preclude a grant of summary judgment to
the defendant,243 other language in Hicks seemed to contradict this
assertion.
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion explained the conflict in the ma-
jority opinion:244
In one passage, the Court states that although proof of
the falsity of the employer's proffered reasons does not
'compe[l] judgment for the plaintiff,' such evidence,
without more, 'will permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.' ... The same
view is implicit in the Court's decision to remand this
case.... keeping Hicks's chance of winning a judgment
alive although he has done no more (in addition to prov-
ing his prima facie case) than show that the reasons prof-
fered by St. Mary's are unworthy of credence. But other
language in the Court's opinion supports a more extreme
conclusion, that proof of the falsity of the employer's
articulated reasons will not even be sufficient to sustain
judgment for the plaintiff. For example, the Court twice
states that the plaintiff must show 'both that the reason
was false, and that discrimination was the real rea-
son.' . .. In addition, in summing up its reading of our
earlier cases, the Court states that '[i]t is not enough...
to disbelieve the employer.' . . . This 'pretext-plus' ap-
proach would turn Burdine on its head.., and it would
result in summary judgment for the employer in the
many cases where the plaintiff has no evidence beyond
that required to prove a prima facie case and to show that
the employer's articulated reasons are unworthy of
credence. 245
Justice Souter's criticism was well-taken. There were two possible
interpretations of Hicks. The first interpretation would permit, but not
require, a factfinder to find for the plaintiff upon a showing that the de-
fendant's articulated reason for its behavior is pretextual. This reading,
supported by the language above, and followed by a number of courts of
242 Id.
243 For a discussion of the proper use of summary judgment in Title VII cases, see gener-
ally McGinley, Credulous Courts, supra note 2.
244 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 535-37.
245 Id. at 535-536. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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appeal,246 I shall call the "permissive presumption." On a defense mo-
tion for summary judgment, a court adopting the permissive presumption
would deny the motion if there were evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that the plaintiff established a prima face case and
that the defendant's articulated reason was pretextual. This interpretation
gave considerable latitude to the factfinder to determine whether it be-
lieves that discrimination had occurred.
The second interpretation would not permit a plaintiffs verdict un-
less there was evidence in the record demonstrating that the defendant
offered a pretextual explanation in order to cover up discriminatory in-
tent. This interpretation would require more than a finding that the de-
fendant's reason for its behavior was pretextual.247 Instead, it would
require some evidence, most likely direct or strong circumstantial evi-
dence, that would permit a jury to find the ultimate fact of discrimina-
tion. I will call this interpretation the "pretext plus" approach. 248
246 See Combs v. Meadowcraft, Inc., 106 F.3d 1519 (11It Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Yenkin-
Majestic Paint Corp., 112 F.3d 831 (6' Cir. 1997); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (31d
Cir. 1995).
247 See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 197 F.3d 688 (5"' Cir. 1999)
(overturning a jury verdict for the plaintiff in a case where there was evidence of pretext and
two age-related comments in the workplace), rev'd 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000); Lattimore v. Polar-
oid Corp., 99 F.3d 456 (1' Cir. 1996) (holding that the lower court should have granted de-
fendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law because although there was sufficient
evidence of pretext to go to the jury, there was no additional evidence of discriminatory intent
as required under Hicks). Compare Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d
1078 (1994) (plaintiff can overcome a motion for summary judgment with proof of falsity but
if plaintiff attempts to show defendant's articulated reason is not the real reason for the deci-
sion, additional evidence of discrimination is needed to survive defense motion for summary
judgment).
248 I take this term from Professor Lanctot. See Lanctot, supra note 2, at 66-67. Profes-
sor Deborah Malamud, a self-identified liberal scholar, apologetically concludes that Hicks is
properly decided. See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After
Hicks, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 2229, 2236, 2243 (1995). Professor Malamud concludes that the
Court had never intended to create a mandatory presumption when it decided McDonnell
Douglas and its progeny. Moreover, she concludes that there is no theoretical justification for
such a presumption. While I believe that the Court's intent is unclear, I agree with Professor
Malamud that the Court's theoretical justification for the mandatory presumption rests on
shaky grounds.
Although the lower courts' avowed justification for the mandatory presumption of dis-
crimination upon a finding of pretext is erroneous, the presumption itself actually furthers
important goals and purposes of the statute. It properly requires a finding of illegal discrimina-
tion upon a showing of pretext because it holds liable defendants who consciously or uncon-
sciously treat members of protected classes in a discriminatory fashion. In doing so, it holds
liable defendants who make non-merit based arbitrary employment decisions that adversely
affect members of protected classes. In other words, the mandatory presumption serves to
demonstrate that discrimination was a but for cause of the employment decision, even though
the employer may not have been aware of the real reasons affecting his decision.
Professor Malamud attacks the mandatory presumption, in part, because it rests on a "ba-
sic assumption" that "unexplained" adverse conduct toward women and persons of color is the
result of discrimination. The assumption that employers act fairly and reasonably absent dis-
crimination, according to Malamud, is false. See id. at 2254-55. While I agree that employers
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c. The Reeves Readjustment
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,249 the Court clari-
fied the holding in Hicks. Reeves was a 57 year old employee who
worked in a toilet manufacturing plant.250 As a supervisor of the line, he
was responsible for recording and reviewing weekly time sheets of the
employees working under his supervision.251 After an investigation in
which the employer found irregularities in time sheets, Reeves was fired.
Reeves sued the employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act.252 Reeves demonstrated a prima facie case of age discrimination
and the employer testified that it fired Reeves because of his poor time
keeping.25 3 In response, Reeves introduced evidence that the defendant's
articulated reason for the discharge was pretextual, testifying that he
kept the time records meticulously, that the time keeping mechanism did
not always function well, and that a superior who played an instrumental
role in the plaintiff's firing had made age-based derrogatory remarks to
do not necessarily act fairly and reasonably toward their employees, and the employment at-
will doctrine protects employers' right to act unreasonably, Title VII is an exception to the
employment at-will doctrine that necessarily guarantees to women and minorities the right to
be judged fairly and reasonably on their merit. See McGinley, Cronyism, supra note 228, at
1011-1016, 1057. Moreover, the psychological and sociological data support the creation of a
mandatory presumption.
Underlying the mandatory presumption is a commitment to merit-based decisionmaking.
The unspoken assumption of then Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Furnco, see supra notes
217 and 218 and accompanying text, is that an employer will (or should) use merit to make
employment decisions unless those decisions are infused with conscious discriminatory ani-
mus. Although subsequent psychological studies demonstrate that the Court's understanding
of the nature of discrimination was not accurate, Furnco's underlying premise that an em-
ployer should make employment decisions based on merit in order to avoid liability for dis-
crimination is consistent with at least one reading of the legislative history of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act and with the purposes and policies of the Act, as amended. See McGinley, Crony-
isin, supra note 228, at 1011-1017.
Given the abundance of psychological research demonstrating that racism and prejudice
still exist and that discriminatory behavior results from unconscious processes, permitting em-
ployers to act arbitrarily toward minorities and women in employment contexts grants employ-
ers permission to treat women and persons of color in a discriminatory fashion. As
psychological theory demonstrates, because of the deep-seated prejudice in our society, the
history of slavery, cognitive groupings and individual employers' motivations, it is very diffi-
cult for white employers to judge black employees without being influenced by race. See
discussion supra, Part I.
For a critique of Professor Malamud's article, see William R. Corbett, Of Babies,
Bathwater, and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time To Jettison McDonnell Doug-
las, 2 EMPL. RTs. & EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 361 (1998).
249 S.Ct 2097 (2000); 68 U.S.L.W.4480 (June 13, 2000).
250 68 U.S.L.W. at 4481.
251 See id.
252 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a makes it unlawful to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an
individual because of his age. It applies only to employees over the age of 40.
See id. at §§ 623(a); 621.
253 Reeves, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4481.
HeinOnline -- 9 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y. 459 1999-2000
460 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:415
the plaintiff.254 The jury held for the plaintiff and the lower court denied
the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 255
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Reeves had failed
to introduce sufficient evidence of age discrimination even though there
was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the employer's
articulated reason for the firing was pretextual. 256
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two questions.
First, the Court addressed whether the combination of the prima facie
case and a showing that the employer's articulated reason for the adverse
employment decision was pretextual would be sufficient for a jury ver-
dict for a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case.257 Second, the
Court decided whether the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law under the circumstances present in Reeves.25 8 Noting that the
Court had never squarely addressed the issue of whether the McDonnell
Douglas framework applies to ADEA cases, but assuming that it does,25 9
the Court held unanimously that the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of
Hicks was wrong.260 Emphasizing that Hicks held that the fact finder is
entitled to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the combination
of the prima facie case and proof that the employer's articulated reason is
false, the Court stated:
Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of
credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence
that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may
be quite persuasive. In appropriate circumstances, the
trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the
explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up
a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consis-
tent with the general principle of evidence law that the
factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty
about a material fact as 'affirmative evidence of guilt.'
Moreover, once the employer's justification has been
eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely
alternative explanation, especially since the employer is
in the best position to put forth the actual reason for its
decision. Thus, a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined
with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's as-
254 See id. at 4485.
255 See id. at 4481.
256 See id.
257 See id.
258 See id. at 4484.
259 See id. at 4482.
260 See id. at 4483.
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serted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to
conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.261
The Court noted that demonstrating a prima facie case combined
with proof of pretext may not always be sufficient for a reasonable jury
to infer discrimination, and gave examples of a few situations where it
would be inappropriate to conclude that discrimination occurred as a re-
sult of the combined evidence. 262 For instance, if the employer "conclu-
sively revealed" that the employer gave a pretextual reason to cover up
another nondiscriminatory reason for the decision 263 or if the plaintiff
created only a weak issue of fact as to the truth or falsity of the em-
ployer's explanation and there was "abundant and uncontroverted in-
dependent evidence that no discrimination had occurred," the defendant
would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law.264
The Court also concluded that the lower court erred in granting San-
derson Plumbing's judgment as a matter of law under the particular cir-
cumstances presented in Reeves.265 The Court held that the Fifth Circuit
erred in deciding the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law
when it limited its inquiry to additional evidence of discrimination and
ignored evidence of the prima facie case and of the pretextual nature of
the defendant's explanation. 266 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit erroneously
drew inferences in favor of the defendant on a motion for judgment as a
matter of law and impermissibly substituted its view of the weight of the
evidence for that of the jury.2 6 7 Because there was sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant had dis-
criminated against plaintiff because of his age, the Court reversed the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 268
Reeves clarified a number of issues raised by Hicks. First, the
Court's examples of the situations where the combination of a prima fa-
cie case and a showing of pretext would not suffice to carry the plain-
tiff's burden, demonstrate the Court's intent to limit the potential scope
of Hicks. Except in limited circumstances, no longer can defendants ar-
gue that plaintiffs must prove "pretext plus." Second, Reeves signaled the
power of juries to decide Title VII disparate treatment cases. Although
Reeves was decided on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, 269 the
261 See id. at 4483-84 (citations omitted).
262 See id. at 4484.
263 See id.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id. at 4485.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 Fed. Rule Civ. P. 50 replaced the former "directed verdict" and "judgment notwith-
standing the verdict," to create a single "judgment as a matter of law." See, e.g., Robert J.
2000]
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courts use the same standard in deciding motions for summary judg-
ment.270 Scholars have criticized lower courts for improvidently granting
summary judgment in Title VII cases since the summary judgment tril-
ogy, and in particular, since Hicks.2 71 Reeves demonstrates that these
criticisms are well-founded. In Reeves, the unanimous Court made it
clear that only under unusual circumstances will it tolerate grants of sum-
mary judgment where the plaintiff presents, in response to the defend-
ant's summary judgment motion, evidence of a prima facie case and that
the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
reiterates this point, stating:
[I]t may be incumbent on the Court, in an appropriate
case, to define more precisely the circumstances in
which plaintiffs will be required to submit evidence be-
yond [the prima facie case and pretext] in order to sur-
vive a motion for a judgment as a matter of law. I
anticipate that such circumstances will be uncommon.
As the Court notes, it is a principle of evidence law that
the jury is entitled to treat a party's dishonesty about a
material fact as evidence of culpability. Under this com-
monsense principle, evidence suggesting that a defend-
ant accused of illegal discrimination has chosen to give a
false explanation for its actions gives rise to a rational
inference that the defendant could be masking its actual,
illegal motivation. Whether the defendant was in fact
motivated by discrimination is of course for the finder of
fact to decide .... But the inference remains B unless it is
conclusively demonstrated, by evidence the district court
is required to credit on a motion for judgment as a matter
of law, that discrimination could not have been the de-
fendant's true motivation. If such conclusive demonstra-
tions are (as I suspect) atypical, it follows that the
ultimate question of liability ordinarily should not be
taken from the jury once the plaintiff has introduced the
two categories of evidence [prima facie case and pre-
text]. Because the Court's opinion leaves room for such
further elaboration in an appropriate case, I join it in
full.2 7 2
Gregory, One Too Many Rivers to Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modem Era of Sumary
Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 689 (1996).
270 See generally Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
271 See, e.g., McGinley, Credulous Courts, supra, note 2; Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse
of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71 (1999).
272 See id. at 4485-86 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)(citations omitted).
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Reeves is an extremely important case for the future of Title VII
disparate treatment law. Had the Court required direct evidence of dis-
crimination in order to prevail, the McDonnell Douglas methodology of
indirect proof would probably not have survived 273 and plaintiffs' recov-
ery would have been extremely limited. Reeves reaffirms the vitality of
the indirect method of proof, offering plaintiffs the opportunity to prove
discriminatory intent through circumstantial evidence.
Ironically, however, Reeves suffers from the same theoretical flaw
as its predecessors. Both the unanimous Court opinion and the concur-
rence of Justice Ginsburg stress the conscious nature of the defendant's
assertion of a pretextual explanation for its adverse employment deci-
sion.274 Both opinions speak in terms of the "falsity" of the employer's
explanation, equating falsity with dissembling or lying on the employer's
part.275 Thus, both apparently ignore that an employer can unknowingly
offer a false explanation for its behavior.
To clarify this point, consider again the Lopez case study. While
Hicks and Reeves identified the possibility of the Second and Fifth Cases
- where the employer's articulated reason for firing Lopez is either false,
or if true, is designed to cover up a reason for the decision,276 they ig-
nored the possibility of the result in the Third and Seventh Cases - that
the employer mistakenly but honestly believed that it fired Lopez for a
legitimate, legal reason but the firing actually resulted from unconscious
racial prejudice against Lopez.277
273 The "mixed motives" provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified the burdens
and proof requirements when there are "mixed motives" for the adverse employment situation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)(1994). This provision holds the employer liable for illegal dis-
crimination once the plaintiff proves that the plaintiff's protected characteristic was a "motivat-
ing factor" in the adverse employment decision. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the
defendant to prove that it would have made the same decision absent the discriminatory "moti-
vating factor" If the employer successfully meets this burden, it can limit the remedies avail-
able to the plaintiff. See § 2000e-5(g). This section is used most frequently where there is
direct evidence or very strong circumstantial evidence of discrimination, which some courts
actually characterize as "direct" evidence. See generally Femandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry,
Inc., 199 F.3d 572 (P' Cir. 1999). If additional evidence of discrimination because of the
plaintiffs protected class were necessary under the McDonnell Douglas test, there would be
little or no difference between the evidence necessary under the McDonnell Douglas test and
the "mixed motives" test, eliminating the need to apply the McDonnell Douglas test. The
problem with this result would be that direct evidence is very hard to come by. For an interest-
ing view that the "mixed motives" provision should apply to both single and mixed motives
cases, see Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REv. 563 (1996).
274 See Reeves, 68 U.S.L.W., at 4483, 4485.
275 See id.
276 See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 517; Reeves, 68 U.S.L.W., at .4485.
277 Justice Scalia is concerned in Hicks about the legal, non-discriminatory reason for
firing an employee that the employer does not want to reveal to the factfinder. See 509 U.S. at
517. My theory is that if a factfinder is going to find the employer's reason pretextual, pretex-
tual reasons that appear to be non-discriminatory really are unconsciously discriminatory or
2000]
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Under Reeves, the issue of whether Lowell Printing illegally dis-
criminated against Ms. Lopez should go to the jury because there is suffi-
cient evidence from which the jury can conclude that the explanation is
pretextual. Ms. Lopez can offer evidence showing that she gets along
well with the other employees, that she is organized and/or that whites
who were much more disorganized were retained. The jury could con-
clude after hearing the testimony of William Snead that he was not truth-
ful in his rendition of his reasons for firing Ms. Lopez.
For example, the jury may believe either that Lopez is organized or
that whites who were disorganized were treated less harshly. This con-
clusion is sufficient for a finding that Lowell Printing fired Ms. Lopez
because of illegal discrimination. It does not, however, demonstrate that
Lowell. Printing had a conscious intent to discriminate against Ms. Lopez
because of her race. Instead, Mr. Snead may be more comfortable work-
ing with a friend, John Randall, who is a white male. Although this
comfort level with someone who is like the decisionmaker affected Mr.
Snead's evaluation of Ms. Lopez' work and ability to deal with her col-
leagues, his attitude toward her is likely shaped in the uncon-
scious.27 8Thus, a finding of discrimination under these circumstances
could represent a finding that the employee was treated differently be-
cause she is black even though the supervisor making the decision was
not consciously aware that the differential treatment resulted because of
the plaintiff's race.
In the alternative, assume that the court permits the case to go to the
jury because the plaintiff has ample comparator evidence and a statement
made by Snead that Lopez is unintelligent. With the help of expert testi-
they undermine the merit principle by elevating, as in this case, a friend of the employer over a
member of a minority group. Hicks justified its decision based on its recognition that not
every negative decision is rooted in intentional conscious discrimination. The Court never
addressed, however, the question of to what extent other "legal," "non-discriminatory" reasons
for an adverse employment decision may be influenced by unconscious racial prejudice. For
example, in Hicks, the Court concluded that although the plaintiff had proved that he was
treated differently from white employees, this differential treatment was not necessarily caused
by race discrimination. It could have resulted from personal animosity that Hicks' supervisor
harbored against Hicks. The Court did not explore, however, the very real possibility that the
supervisor's personal animosity was caused by unconscious or conscious prejudice against
blacks. This failure demonstrates an impoverished understanding of the nature of bias and
prejudice and the resulting discriminatory behavior.
278 People in general tend to categorize people who are different less favorably. See Jo-
seph G. Weber, The Nature of Ethnocentric Attribution Bias, 30 J. ExPER. Soc. PSYCHOL. 482-
504 (1994); Frances Olsen, Affirmative Action: Necessary But Not Sufficient, 71 CHi.-KwT L.
REv. 937, (1996). This is a problematic response given the domination of white male culture
in the higher ranks of employment in this nation. See generally, McGinley, Cronyisin, supra
note 228 (discussing how cronyism operates to disadvantage women and blacks).
This may cause even greater problems where a white manager evaluates an African
American because the evaluator most likely harbors unconscious negative attitudes toward
blacks that may affect his or her behavior. See supra Part I.A.
HeinOnline -- 9 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y. 464 1999-2000
!VIVA LA EvoLucIN!
mony, Lopez may be able to demonstrate that this characterization is not
neutral, but results from negative stereotypes about blacks. Given the
comparator evidence and the expert testimony about stereotyping, a jury
could reasonably conclude that Snead discharged Lopez because of her
race. This finding, however, does not necessarily show that Snead was
consciously aware that he was discharging Lopez because of her race. In
fact, Snead could have a good faith belief that Lopez is unintelligent.
Psychological theory demonstrates, however, that Snead's judgment
about Ms. Lopez is likely the result of discriminatory attitudes held in the
unconscious. Psychological theory further suggests that Snead's after-
the-fact justification of the firing will evaluate Lopez more negatively
than if Lopez had been white.279 This more salient reaction results from
white ambivalence toward blacks and their need to justify their actions in
order to maintain a positive self image that they are not racist.280
As the Lopez hypothetical demonstrates, by ignoring the underlying
flaw in the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine logic, Hicks and Reeves may
still find employers liable for discriminatory behavior caused by uncon-
scious prejudices.
The result, however, is not altogether bad. In actuality, it is more
consistent with the policy behind Title VII: the eradication of discrimina-
tion in the workplace.281 The real problem is the Court's failure to ac-
knowledge and embrace these potential results, a failure that could lead
to another counter-evolution in response to Reeves.
2. Pattern and Practice Cases: Evolution and Counter-Evolution
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine applies to individual acts of discrimi-
nation; a different method of proof exists for cases alleging a pattern and
practice of discrimination. 282 In pattern and practice cases brought by
the EEOC 283 the factfinder must find that the employer discriminated
intentionally against a class of plaintiffs. In order to prove a pattern and
practice of discrimination, the government must prove "more than the
mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory
acts. It [has] to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial
279 See discussion supra, Part I.A.
280 See discussion supra, Part I.A, particularly the work of Professors Dovidio and
Gaertner.
281 Even so, a return to the mandatory presumption would further this policy even more
by removing from the jury the discretion to determine the underlying reason for the pretextual
statement.
282 See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 357-358 (1977).
283 Originally, the Attorney General was authorized to bring pattern and practice suits
against private or public defendants. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a)(1994). When the Act was
amended in 1972, the functions of the Attorney General were transferred to the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c)(1994); see also International
Bhd., 431 U.S. at 329 n.1.
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discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure - the
regular rather than the unusual practice. 284
a. Statistical and Anecdotal Evidence
In Teamsters v. United States285 the United States Attorney General
sued a nationwide common carrier and a union representing a large
group of the company's employees. The government alleged that the
defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of race discrimination
against blacks and Hispanics, by failing to hire them into the better-paid
over-the-road driver positions. Instead, according to the government, the
company hired blacks and Hispanics into lower paying, less desirable
jobs as servicemen or local city drivers and thereafter discriminated
against them in promotions and transfers. 286 The lower court held that
the government had met its burden of proving illegal discrimination
against the hauling company by presenting evidence of a statistical dis-
parity between the general population of blacks in the communities
where the company operated and in the workforce2 87 and by offering
anecdotal evidence of 40 individual cases of discrimination.
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's finding of discrimina-
tion against the company, concluding that the factfinder could infer an
intent to discriminate from statistical proof, bolstered by anecdotes of
individual instances of discriminatory treatment.288 While the Court em-
phasized the conscious intentional nature of the defendant's behavior,
this interpretation is not the only possible inference drawn from the evi-
dence. Although statistical proof plus anecdotal evidence of discrimina-
tory treatment can raise an inference of conscious discriminatory intent,
this proof does not necessarily demonstrate that the employer con-
sciously undertook to eliminate African American applicants for over-
the-road jobs. An alternative inference is possible: defendants may have
made little or no effort to combat the products of unconscious discrimi-
nation in the hiring, evaluation and promotional processes.
In the case of either inference, it is extremely likely that the statis-
tics prove that the applicant's or employee's race made a difference in
the employment decision, either on an individual level or on a structural
level.
A closer look at Lopez demonstrates this point. Assume that when
Snead arrived at Lowell Printing there were many blacks working under
him. Little by little, the workforce became whiter through firings, natu-
284 See id. at 336.
285 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
286 See International Bhd., 431 U.S. at 329.
287 See id. at 337-38.
288 See id. at 339.
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ral attrition and hiring white employees. Assuming that there are suffi-
cient numbers of employees working at Lowell for the results to be
statistically significant, a significant variation between the number of
blacks at Lowell and those available in the relevant labor pool, if com-
bined with anecdotes of differential treatment of blacks at the company,
would be sufficient under Teamsters and its progeny to establish that
Lowell intentionally discriminated against African Americans.
While this evidence could prove that Snead, Lowell's agent, con-
sciously intended to eliminate blacks from the workforce, this is not a
necessary conclusion. It could also prove that Snead acted on uncon-
sciously held stereotypes and prejudices against blacks, that his assess-
ment of the blacks working for him and of black job applicants was
skewed because unconsciously he interpreted information about black
applicants and employees less favorably. Moreover, if Snead belongs to
the 80% of Americans who believe that they are not racist, he may feel a
need to justify his actions toward blacks by emphasizing the negative
traits of blacks he fires, fails to promote or fails to hire.289 This need
may account for his evaluation of his employees, leading to their firings,
"voluntary" resignations and possibly, fewer job applicants.
As with the McDonnell Douglas mandatory presumption, the mis-
understanding of the nature of bias and prejudice led to an incomplete
justification for the creation of an inference of discrimination in Pattern
and Practice cases. In turn, this error has, perhaps unconsciously, led to
an attack on Pattern and Practice cases.
b. The Sears Counter-Evolution
Employers defend the pattern and practice cases in an increasingly
sophisticated manner, challenging the plaintiff's choice of statistical
pool, 290 or the inference of intent raised by the statistics. 291 In EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,292 for example, the EEOC had presented sophisti-
cated regression analyses to demonstrate that Sears had discriminated in
favor of men and against women in its assignment of predominately men
to its higher paying "outside" commission sales jobs and predominately
women to the lower paying inside non-commission sales jobs. Sears suc-
cessfully defended by using the lack of interest defense. Defense experts
testified that women did not desire the more highly paid jobs because
these jobs required more irregular hours and more aggressive sales. The
trial judge credited this testimony, finding that female sales applicants
289 See discussion supra, Part I.A.
290 See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
291 See EEOC v. Sears Roebuck, Inc., 839 F.2d 302 (7' Cir. 1988).
292 See id.
2000]
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preferred lower-paying noncommission sales jobs.293 Plaintiffs argued
on appeal to the Seventh Circuit that the generalized evidence of wo-
men's preference as a matter of law could not rebut the EEOC's statisti-
cal presentation. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's
judgment for Sears.294
In Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations
of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack
of Interest Argument,295 Professor Vicki Schultz discusses the lack of
interest defense2 96 raised by Sears and defendants in other cases. She
examined a data set of all published employment discrimination cases
decided between 1965 and 1987 in which the lower court considered and
addressed the lack of interest argument.297 Her analysis demonstrates
that both the conservative298 and the liberal299 views about women tend
to reinforce the attitude that women enter the workforce with a set notion
about the types of jobs they desire.3° Conservative judges, according to
Schultz, see a difference in nature between men and women and find this
notion natural, one that should not impose liability on the employer.30'
Thus, conservative judges tend to reinforce stereotypes about women
through their judicial reasoning.
Although liberal judges state that they do not want to reinforce ste-
reotypes, they, too, believe that women have fixed pre-employment no-
tions of their job preferences. Thus, liberal judges look at the woman
who wants a "man's" job as ha"ing the right to achieve the job, but
employers will be liable only if they bar these women from the jobs they
desire. These women, however, are viewed as 'ungendered" subjects
who emerge from a gender-free social order with the same aspirations
and values as men."' 302 Schultz posits that this liberal focus on a wo-
man's individual decision actually reinforces the stereotype about most
293 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F.Supp. 1264, 1324-25 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
294 See generally EEOC v. Sears Roebuck Inc., 839 F.2d 302 (7t' 1988).
295 Vicki Schultz, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1749 (1990).
296 Professor Schultz finds that the lack of interest defense has been asserted most fre-
quently in pattern and practice or class action cases brought under either the disparate treat-
ment or the disparate impact theories. See id at 1767-68.
297 See id. at 1766-67.
298 Professor Schultz defines "conservative" courts as those generally accepting the lack
of interest argument in sex discrimination and refusing to infer sex discrimination from statis-
tics. See id. at 1784 n.125.
299 Professor Schultz uses the term "liberal" to refer to courts rejecting the lack of interest
argument in sex discrimination cases. See id. at 1785 n.134.
300 See id. at 1792.
301 See id at 1799-1800.
302 See id at 1800.
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women.30 3 The women who desire the "male" jobs are seen as
genderless and tend to differ from the "norm".3°4
Both of these concepts, according to Schultz, are inaccurate. By
assuming that women come to employers with specific, inalterable pref-
erences, both conservative and liberal courts fail to consider how em-
ployers shape women's work aspirations. 30 5 Professor Schultz
demonstrates through an analysis of social science research that many
women change their views of the types of jobs they wish depending on
the availability and the attractiveness of the work.30 6 Thus, according to
Schultz, although women are socialized to follow particular "feminine"
career paths, this socialization is not wholly determinative of women's
later careers.307 In fact, according to Professor Schultz, women's job
"choices" are often shaped by the availability of different types of work
to women,308 by the lack of mobility from traditionally "female" jobs, 30 9
and by the prevalence of harassment in the work cultures of traditionally
male jobs.310
The lack of interest defense, therefore, rests on stereotypical as-
sumptions about women's natural preferences and about women's reac-
tions to socialization concerning their job choices, perhaps formed in the
unconscious, rather than hard evidence of inherent differences between
men and women's job interests at the workplace. Permitting the defense
actually reinforces the stereotype about women and exonerates employ-
ers of their responsibility in shaping women's ability and preferences to
perform certain types of positions. Even courts that do not permit the
defense join in rhetoric and assumptions that lead to stereotyping of wo-
men, participating in the denial of equal opportunities for women in the
workplace.
Professor Schultz demonstrates that an acceptance of the lack of
interest defense in employment discrimination cases is not inevitable.31'
She looks at the treatment of race discrimination cases and how the de-
fense has fared. 312 Unlike in sex discrimination cases, Professor Schultz
demonstrates that early in the history of Title VII, courts refused to enter-
303 See id. at 1808.
304 See id. at 1807.
305 See id. at 1811. One example of how employers shape women's job preferences is
their advertising strategies. Schultz demonstrates that the type of job advertising can have a
profound effect on women's interest and response. See id. at 1811-12; supra note 295.
306 See id. at 1821-28.
307 See id.
308 See id. at 1816, 1823.
309 See id. at 1827.
310 See id. at 1832-33.
311 See id. at 1770-71.
312 See id. at 1771.
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tain the lack of interest defense in race discrimination cases.313 Courts
instead developed what Schultz terms the "futility doctrine. '3 14 That
doctrine accounts for blacks' failure to apply in representative numbers
for positions earlier considered to be "white" jobs by concluding that
blacks' lower application rates resulted from the employer's history of
discrimination and blacks' sense of futility rather than from a lack of
interest.315 This doctrine created "almost an irrebuttable presumption"
that blacks' failure to apply resulted from the employer's history of dis-
crimination. 316 Professor Schultz notes that the futility doctrine could
have been applicable in sex discrimination cases, but generally has not
been used by the courts. 317
Ironically, in a subsequent empirical study of the lack of interest
defense in both sex and race discrimination,3 18 Professors Stephen Pet-
terson and Vicki Schultz find that although early in the history of Title
VII the defense was considerably more successful against women than
against racial minorities,319 later on the defense became increasingly suc-
cessful against minorities and was apparently endorsed by the Supreme
Court.320 This defense, as Schultz and Petterson note, is rooted in stere-
otyping. It assumes for women that they have less interest in achieving
more highly paid, visible jobs in the workplace and that their lack of
interest stems from social or biological causes, not from the employer's
practices. 321 For African Americans, this defense assumes the deroga-
tory stereotype that blacks lack the motivation and drive to work hard. 322
According to Schultz and Petterson:
[S]uch explanations, apparently adopted by the Supreme
Court in Wards Cove, minority workers select and stay
in lower-paying jobs because they lack the initiative to
pursue better alternatives. Appeals to such accounts,
313 See id. at 1771-72.
314 See id. at 1772.
315 See id.
316 Id. at 1773.
317 See id. at 1776.
318 See Vicki Schultz and Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Em-
pirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation,
59 U. Cm. L. REv. 1073 (1992).
319 See id. at 1081.
320 See id. at 1082. As Schultz and Petterson note, in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989), despite a severely racially segregated workplace in the Alaskan salmon
canneries, including segregated housing and eating facilities and word-of-mouth hiring sys-
tems, the Court held that there was no showing of discrimination against the low-paid cannery
workers of color because the cannery workers did not seek other jobs within the company.
This decision affinned a lower court finding of a general lack of interest on the part of the
cannery workers in the better jobs. See Schultz and Petterson, supra note 318, at 1077-78.
321 See id. at 1079.
322 See id. at 1078-80.
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which tend to romanticize women and denigrate minori-
ties, produce similar effects in Title VII cases. By por-
traying segregation as the expression of women's or
minorities' preexisting job preferences, and by attribut-
ing their preferences to social and cultural forces beyond
employers' control, the lack of interest defense priva-
tizes job segregation and places it beyond the responsi-
bility of employers and courts.323
Schultz and Petterson's findings support my theory that a counter-
evolution is taking place in employment discrimination law. Their em-
pirical study demonstrates convincingly that courts have since the begin-
nings of Title VII approached class action cases with a gender bias, and
that this bias continues to the present day. Perhaps more startling, how-
ever, is the finding that there has been. a marked change in courts' reac-
tion to race discrimination cases. While the earlier race cases
demonstrated a willingness to attribute a statistical disparity between mi-
norities and whites to discrimination, the newer cases look at statistics
with a jaundiced eye.3 2 4 Race discrimination cases have gone the route
of sex discrimination cases.
Why does this lack of interest defense succeed? In part, it succeeds
because judges do not believe that discrimination is prevalent in today's
workplace.3 25 Its success is also due to a mistaken theoretical justifica-
tion for the inference of conscious discrimination from statistical proof;
this error subjects the statistical method of proof to attack. Statistical
proof demonstrating a disparity in the numbers of woman and blacks in
particular jobs does not necessarily create the inference of a conscious
discriminatory intent.
The inference can be justified, however, based on strong psycholog-
ical and sociological evidence that confirms our tendency to permit un-
conscious racist and sexist prejudice to affect decisionmaking. The
statistical pattern can raise an inference that an employer has discrimi-
nated against a class of women or persons of color, consciously or
unconsciously.
323 Id. at 1080.
324 See id. at 1159-60.
325 See Selni, supra note 13, at 284 (arguing that the Court has consistently seen discrim-
ination only when it has been overt); Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 997 (1994) (opining that St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks can be explained by the Court's belief that discrimination does not
really exist anymore).
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3. Stereotyping as Direct Evidence
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins326 established what I call the "Stere-
otyping Doctrine." This doctrine, in effect, sees overt stereotyping by a
decisionmaker as virtually the equivalent of direct evidence of discrimi-
nation. In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, an extraordinarily successful
accountant, applied for partnership. 327 She was denied, in part, because
of the partners' use of stereotyping to evaluate her candidacy. 32 Her
mentor explained to her that she could improve her chances of election to
partnership if she would "walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry". 329 Justice Bren-
nan writing for the Court, explained the power of stereotyping:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate em-
ployees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for "'[iun forbid-
ding employers to discriminate against individuals be-
cause of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and wo-
men resulting from sex stereotypes."' . . . An employer
who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose posi-
tions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave
aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII
lifts women out of this bind.330
Justice O'Connor's concurrence emphatically decried the use of
stereotyping in the employment context, treating it as if it were direct
evidence of conscious discriminatory intent:
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the
room where partnership decisions were being made. As
326 Where the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine method of proof applies to cases alleging that
the employer had a single discriminatory motive for the firing, a different standard of proof
applies in mixed motive cases. This different standard originated in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) and was subsequently modified by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)(1994). According to the 1991 Act, once a plaintiff demonstrates that an
illegitimate factor such as race was a motivating factor in the employer's decision, the em-
ployer is liable. The employer, however, can limit the remedies available to the plaintiff by
proving that it also had a legitimate reason for taking the adverse employment action and that
it would have fired the plaintiff even absent the illegitimate reason. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (1994).
327 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 233.
328 Id. at 255-56.
329 Id. at 272 (O'Connor J., concurring) (quoting 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C.
1985)).
330 Id. at 251 (citations omitted).
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the partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard
several of them make sexist remarks in discussing her
suitability for partnership. As the decisionmakers exited
the room, she was told by one of those privy to the
decisonmaking process that her gender was a major rea-
son for the rejection of her partnership bid.331
Evidence of stereotyping will remove the case from the McDonnell
Douglas proof construct, allowing the plaintiff to argue that the statement
demonstrates that the protected characteristic was a motivating factor in
the employment decision.332
To understand the stereotyping doctrine, let us add one more fact to
Lopez. Assume that Mr. Snead told Ms. Lopez at the time of her firing,
"Your kind is lazy and difficult to get along with." This statement, ex-
pressing a stereotype about African Americans, more clearly links Lo-
pez' firing to her race. According to the court, this statement would
demonstrate a conscious intent to discriminate because of Lopez' race.
However, this is not a necessary conclusion. Snead may have the follow-
ing different states of mind:
CASE EIGHT
Snead consciously decided to fire Ms. Lopez because of her race.
He consciously believes the stereotype that blacks are lazy and he com-
municates that conscious belief to Lopez at the time of her firing. He is
aware that the belief is a stereotype and he acts upon it nonetheless be-
cause, based on his experience, the stereotype is true. This statement,
therefore, would be the equivalent of "I am firing you because you are
black. Like all blacks, you are lazy."
CASE NINE
Snead consciously decided to fire Ms. Lopez because he believes
that she is lazy. He is aware of the stereotype that blacks are lazy and
even though he believes that the stereotype might not be true in some
cases, he has concluded that it fits Ms. Lopez' case. He is consciously
applying what he knows to be a stereotype about blacks to Ms. Lopez
case and is acting upon it. He is not aware, however, that the stereotype
has unconsciously affected his evaluation of Lopez, allowing him to
judge her more harshly than her white counterparts.
CASE TEN
331 Id. at 272 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
332 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) of the 1991 Act, which amended Price Waterhouse, states:
Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment practice is estab-
lished when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
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Snead believes the stereotype that "blacks are lazy," but he is una-
ware that this belief about blacks is a stereotype. Instead, his experience
has demonstrated that the statement is true. He is also unaware that the
stereotype, formed in his unconscious, has influenced his judgment about
Ms. Lopez.
CASE ELEVEN
Snead believes the stereotype that "blacks are lazy," but has not
fired Lopez as a result of the stereotype. In fact, Lopez is a lazy person
and does not get along with other employees and Snead fires her for
these reasons.
Under the stereotypes doctrine the statement "your kind is lazy and
difficult to get along with," made at the time of the firing by the deci-
sionmaker is legally sufficient to prove that race "was a motivating fac-
tor" in the decision to fire Lopez and to hold Lowell liable for illegal
discrimination. Lowell would then have the opportunity to limit the
plaintiff's remedies by proving that it would have fired Lopez for a legit-
imate reason even absent the role race played in the decision. 333 Under
this doctrine, the employer would be liable in Cases Eight through
Eleven in Lopez unless Lowell Printing could prove that it would have
fired Lopez for a legal reason that is unrelated to the stereotyping. The
law would see Cases Eight through Eleven as indistinguishable, even
though the moral culpability of the employer differs significantly in these
cases. Snead's moral failure in Case Eight - where he is aware of the
stereotype and acts upon it because he has a conscious racist attitude, is
considerably greater than that in Cases Nine or Ten, where he uncon-
sciously uses race as a filtering mechanism to assess the quality of his
employee. In Cases Nine, Ten and Eleven, the employer does not pos-
sess the conscious intent to discriminate that the law presumes. Rather,
Snead judges Lopez through the distorted cognitive lens of a stereotype
and his behavior is affected by it.334 Case Ten, in fact, is similar to Cases
Three and Seven above, where Snead's honest but mistaken belief that
his employee is not up to par is influenced by an unconscious prejudice.
In Case Eleven, the employer could be held liable even though the stere-
otype may not have influenced his attitude toward Lopez.
Lopez demonstrates that the only difference between the cases de-
cided under the Price Waterhouse test and those decided under Burdine
is the statement, which serves to prove to the factfinder that race or gen-
der was a causal factor in the employment decision. Thus, it appears that
it is not the moral culpability of the decisionmaker that the courts' proof
333 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1994).
334 See discussion on stereotyping supra Part I.
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methodologies determine in assessing liability, but rather whether the
decision was motivated by the protected characteristic.335 A stereotypi-
cal statement serves to demonstrate to the factfinder that race played a
causal role in the decisionmaking process. It does not show, as we have
seen in Case Ten, that the employer consciously judged the employee
differently because of her race.
An analysis of these cases demonstrates that even in situations
where the Court would find significant evidence of discriminatory "in-
tent," the evidence, in fact, proves only that the decision was infected by
illegal considerations. It does not prove whether those considerations are
conscious or unconscious on the employer's part. The Stereotyping Doc-
trine, like the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine approach, while unable to de-
fine which employers possess culpable states of mind, is useful in
proving causation - it ensures that it is likely that the protected character-
istic was a motivating factor that made a difference in the outcome.
Price Waterhouse unwittingly expands the definition of intent to in-
clude the use of unconsciously or consciously held stereotypes to make
employment decisions. Even though some of the partners at Price
Waterhouse may have been unaware that their expectations of Ms. Hop-
kins were affected by gender stereotypes, the Court still held the em-
ployer liable for permitting stereotypes to influence the decisionmaking
process.
3 3 6
The counter-evolution to the Stereotyping Doctrine originated in
Price Waterhouse itself. Both Justice Brennan's plurality337 and Justice
O'Connor's concurrence eschew the sufficiency of stray remarks to cre-
ate employer liability. Justice O'Connor's statement, however, is nor-
mally relied upon by courts enforcing the Stray Remarks Doctrine.338
Justice O'Connor stated:
335 Case 12 is an exception. In this case, the employer will be liable even if he is not
acting on the stereotype. It seems highly likely, however, that an employer who makes this
type of statement to an employee, at the time of the discharge is affected by the stereotype
either unconsciously or consciously.
336 This is a break from Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 490 U.S. 977 (1988), where
the Court stated that the subjective decision making process could be examined under the
disparate impact theory but, in a similar fact situation, was probably insufficient to demon-
strate intentional discrimination.
337 Justice Brennan stated:
Remarks at work that are based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gen-
der played a part in the particular employment decision. The plaintiff must show
that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision. In making
this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a
part. In any event, the stereotyping in this case did not simply consist of stray
remarks.
Watson, 490 U.S. at 251.
338 See, e.g., Holly-Anne Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242 (7" Cir. 1996).
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[S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps proba-
tive of sexual harassment, cannot justify requiring the
employer to prove that its hiring or promotion decisions
were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers un-
related to the decisional process itself, suffice tosatisfy
the plaintiff's burden in this regard.339
Many of the courts have enforced the Stray Remarks Doctrine with
vigor, holding that a remark evidencing a race or gender stereotype must
be made by the decisionmaker at or close to the time of the adverse
employment decision so that the employee can prove that there is a
causal connection between the remark and the employment decision.340
Moreover, once the courts find that the circumstances do not meet these
requirements of direct proof, some courts refuse to consider the remarks
as circumstantial evidence combined with other circumstantial evidence
to prove pretext.341 This interpretation distorts Justice O'Connor's state-
ment in Price Waterhouse that applies only to the creation of a direct
inference of discrimination. Moreover, this interpretation demonstrates a
poor understanding of the nature of stereotyping, how stereotypes are
formed through cognitive processing and how they can unconsciously
affect our evaluations of others' work. 342 Finally, like the counter-evolu-
tion spawned by Hicks, the Stray Remarks counter-evolution contributes
339 Watson, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (citations omitted).
340 See, e.g., Nichols v. Loral Vought Systems Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41-42 (5t, Cir. 1996)
("To be probative, allegedly discriminatory statements must be made by the relevant decision
maker."); EEOC v. Texas Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d 1173 (5h Cir. 1996) (age-related com-
ments insufficient to survive summary judgment motion); Gilberto Mulero-Rodriguez v.
Ponte, 98 F.3d 670, (1' Cir. 1996) (nexus existed in record between eight month old comment
and adverse employment decision).
341 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Schoenber, Fisher & Newman, Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 723-724 (7"h
Cir. 1997) (ignoring strong anti-pregnancy statements by supervisor in pregnancy discrimina-
tion case); Fuka v. Thomson Consumer Electronics, 82 F.3d 1397 (7' Cir. 1996) (age-related
comments made by decisionmaker insufficient for direct evidence and not considered under
McDonnell Douglas proof); Holly-Anne Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 242-243 (7'h
Cir. 1996) (anti-pregnancy remarks made by supervisor insufficient for direct evidence of
pregnancy discrimination and not considered under McDonnell Douglas). But see Huff v.
UARCO, Inc., 122 F. 3d 374, 385 (7" Cir. 1997) (remarks insufficient to prove age discrimi-
nation directly can be combined with other evidence to prove a circumstantial case under
McDonnell Douglas).
342 For a description of stereotyping, see supra Part I. In Structuralist and Cultural Domn-
ination Theories Meet Title VII, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2370 (1994), Professor Martha Chamallas
presents a critique of the Court's "motivational" approach to stereotyping in Price Waterhouse
rather than the structural approach offered by expert witness, Dr. Susan Fiske. Unlike a moti-
vational analysis which focuses on the mindset of the employer and employee, the structural
approach would focus on the employee's status as a token, making her particularly vulnerable
to stereotyping and typecasting. See Chamallas, at 2395-98. An expanded stereotyping ap-
proach that abolishes the stray remarks doctrine could follow the structural model.
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to increased inappropriate use of summary judgment to dispose of
cases.
343
4. Intent's Purpose: Confusing Causation and Mental State
These cases demonstrate that Title VII's concept of intent differs
significantly from that in tort law. While in tort law, the intent require-
ment appears to assure the moral culpability of the actor, in employment
discrimination law, proof of intent guarantees that the employment deci-
sion was made because of the employee's protected characteristic,
whether or not the employer is aware of the motivation. 344 This purpose,
while apparently unanticipated by legislators passing the original Act, is
consistent with the goal of the statute to guarantee equal economic op-
portunities to person of color and women and is also consistent with the
reasoning underlying Griggs and the disparate impact theory.345
While "intent" in employment discrimination law is the same as
"motive," tort law defines "intent" with reference to the actor's state of
mind regarding the act and its consequences. In tort law for example,
"intent" involves three basic requirements:
It is a state of mind; about consequences of an act (or omission) and
not about the act itself, and (3) it extends not only to having in the mind a
purpose (or desire) to bring about given consequences but also to having
in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given consequences are substantially
certain to result from the act.346
343 See, e.g., Holly-Anne Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238 (7"' Cir. 1996) (affirming
summary judgment in pregnancy discrimination case); Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher &
Newman, ltd., 140 F.3d 716 (7' Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment in pregnancy dis-
crimination case). Although in many instances before Price Waterhouse, courts used the term
"direct evidence" incorrectly in the true evidentiary sense of the term, see Ann C. McGinley,
Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title
VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203, 213 n. 37 (1993), this evidence of stereotyping is
still probative and should often create a genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary
judgment in a McDonnell Douglas case.
344 Even if consciously aware, the actor need not have a malicious or invidious purpose to
harm in order to discriminate intentionally. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656
(1987) (holding union liable for failing to represent black employees' grievances of racial
discrimination even if purpose is non-discriminatory); compare St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) (white employer not liable for personal animus against black
employee unless shown to be racially motivated). But see Wessman v. Gittens, 1998 U.S.
App. Lexis 29805, at *95-96 (1t Cir. 1998) (Lipez, J., dissenting).
345 The Court created the disparate impact theory of discrimination in its decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding an employer liable for the disparate
impact on blacks caused by a neutral policy requiring that job applicants or transferees possess
a high school diploma and the employer could not prove that the job requirements were neces-
sary and business-related). The disparate impact policy does not require intent to discriminate,
but rather focuses on the impact of the policy and the purpose of the Act.
346 See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts, 5t' ed. (1984).
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In tort law, for intent to exist, the actor need not have a hostile
attitude toward the victim or toward another and he need not have a de-
sire to do any harm.347 In fact, the actor could be liable for an intentional
tort even though he or she desires to help the person who is harmed.3 48
But neither is the mere knowledge and/or appreciation of a risk suf-
ficient for intent to exist.3 49 Instead, the actor must have a purpose or
desire to bring about certain consequences and a belief or knowledge that
the consequences are substantially certain to occur. In Gouger v.
Hardtke,350 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin explained the difference
between intentional torts and negligence:
The principal difference between negligent and inten-
tional conduct is 'the difference in the probability, under
the circumstances known to the actor and according to
common experience, that a certain consequence or class
of consequences will follow from a certain act.' Intent
requires both an intent to do an act and an intent to cause
injury by that act. An intent to cause injury exists where
the actor subjectively intends to cause injury or where
injury is substantially certain to occur from the actor's
conduct. If the conduct merely creates a foreseeable risk
of some harm to someone, which may or may not result,
the conduct is negligent.351
If the tort definition of intent were applied to Lopez, the "act" would
be the firing of Lopez and the filling of the position with John Randall.
The consequences of the act are that a black woman no longer has a job
at Lowell while a white male does. There is no question that Snead had a
desire or purpose to bring about the consequences of his act or at least an
awareness that the consequences were substantially certain to occur.
Although this state of mind defines intent in tort law, it has never
been sufficient to constitute "intentional discrimination" under the em-
ployment discrimination laws. In determining whether "discriminatory
intent" exists in an employment discrimination case, courts look at the
reason or motivation for the act. The actor's purpose must not only be to
treat someone of a protected characteristic differently; it must also be to
treat someone differently because of the protected characteristic.
347 See id. at 36.
348 See id.
349 See id.
350 167 Wis. 2d 504 (Wis. 1992).
351 Id. at 512; see also Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1972) (holding that
knowledge and appreciation of risk, absent substantial certainty that the harm will occur, is not
sufficient to constitute intent).
HeinOnline -- 9 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y. 478 1999-2000
!IVvA LA EVOLUCI6N!
Unlike in the traditional torts area, where motive is nothing more
than the reason driving the employer's act, motive in employment dis-
crimination law is the essence of the tort. This is true because the under-
lying act in our story - Snead's firing of Lopez - is legal. Taken alone,
the act does not create liability. Lowell will be liable only if Snead fires
Lopez because of her race. Thus, it seems that intent and motive, used
interchangeably in employment discrimination discourse, play the same
role as but for causation. That is, a finding of "intent" demonstrates that
the protected characteristic plays a role in the employment decision and
makes a difference in the outcome.352 It does not necessarily imply that
the employer was conscious of the reason for his or her decision. It im-
plies only that the motivation behind the decision, whether conscious or
unconscious, was the employee's protected characteristic.
Lopez demonstrates this point. Especially under the traditional Mc-
Donnell Douglas/Burdine analysis before Hicks, which required a find-
ing of discrimination once pretext is shown, the intent requirement,
achieved through a finding of pretext, will define which actions stem
from discriminatory motives whether conscious or not. Even after Hicks
and Reeves, as demonstrated above, many acts resulting from uncon-
scious prejudice toward protected class members, will lead to employer
liability. As we have seen above, this is also true in the area of pattern
and practice cases and those cases applying the stereotyping doctrine.
5. Evolutionary and Counter-Evolutionary Patterns
As we have seen, in every major area of employment discrimination
law under Title VII, a pattern has developed. First, the courts have de-
parted from the language of the statute and perhaps from the intent of the
legislature in order to give full effect to the egalitarian purposes of the
statute. This movement is represented by the creation of the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine methodology, and the use of statistical proof in pattern
and practice cases.35 3 Both McDonnell Douglas/Burdine and the pattern
and practice cases permitted a finding of discrimination based on con-
scious or unconscious discriminatory actions. A similar evolution oc-
curred in the emergence of the stereotype doctrine in Price Waterhouse,
which holds an employer liable who apparently acts upon a stereotype
even though he may be unaware that his perception is rooted in uncon-
scious biases.
The second stage of the pattern is a counter-evolution. In the Mc-
Donnell Douglas cases, the Court decided Hicks which made it more
difficult for employees to prove discrimination, leading to increased
352 See, e.g., Holzman v. Jaymar-Ruby, Inc., 916 F.2d 1298, 1304 (7th Cir. 1990).
353 The evolution also occurred with the emergence of the disparate impact cause of ac-
tion. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
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summary judgments and in some courts, an expectation that the em-
ployee will use direct evidence to prove discrimination. 354 Recently,
however, the Court cut back on Hicks in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing,
Inc. In pattern and practice cases, the Court has moved away from an
acceptance of general population statistics as proof of discrimination, re-
quiring much more specific and sophisticated statistical analysis and per-
mitting the lack of interest defense in both race and sex discrimination
cases.355 In Price Waterhouse cases, although the stereotype doctrine
still exists, courts often dismiss strong evidence of the presence of stere-
otyping in the workplace as "stray remarks" having no probative value.
Although not always apparent from the courts' opinions, this re-
definition of intent represents a major shift in the focus of employment
discrimination law, a shift away from an emphasis on the purpose of
creating economic opportunity for persons of color and women and to-
ward a purpose never articulated in the original statute: punishment of
only those employers who make adverse employment decisions because
of conscious, (and often) invidious attitudes toward members of pro-
tected groups.
Curiously, this shift has occurred in the face of mounting evidence
in the psychological literature that much discrimination results not from
a conscious intent to discriminate, but from cognitive categorizations or
subconscious processes. Recent cramped interpretations of the definition
of discriminatory intent result in minimal enforcement of the law, erring
on the side of the employer. The effect: by imposing a new, more rigor-
ous intent standard and by ignoring that discrimination occurs in large
part without a conscious intent to discriminate, more recent court deci-
sions reinforce structural discrimination against women and minorities
caused by a history of oppression of these groups that cannot be erased
without a conscious effort.35 6 Part III suggests legislative proposals and
judicial interpretations of the existing statute that would ameliorate the
problem.
III. RESPECTING EVOLUTION: CONFORMING THE LAW TO
THE EVIDENCE
This Part offers legislative and judicial proposals that would move
in the direction of conforming the law to the social science evidence
about the nature of discrimination. Although a legislative solution would
354 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (b).
355 See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (b).
356 The only conscious effort - affirmative action - is currently under attack as discrimi-
nation itself. See Ann C. McGinley, Affirmative Action Awash in Confiision: Backwvard-Look-
ing-Future-Oriented Justifications for Race-Conscious Measures, 4 RoGER WiLL. L. REv. 209
(1998).
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be preferable, absent legislative amendment, the lower courts could reach
similar results through strict summary judgment standards and the use of
jury instructions that would make explicit the intent to find employers
liable for discriminatory behavior resulting from unconscious biases.
A. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
An amended statute would define intent as unconscious as well as
conscious. It would overturn Hicks and Reeves to the extent they reject
the mandatory presumption, reaffirming the traditional McDonnell Doug-
las construct, expand the stereotypes doctrine established in Price
Waterhouse, and establish that discriminatory racial or sexual remarks
are relevant in proving discrimination under McDonnell Douglas even if
they do not rise to the level of direct evidence. In cases alleging a pattern
and practice, the new statute would permit lack of interest as an affirma-
tive defense, requiring defendants to prove the extent to which a lack of
interest, unaffected by the employer's actions, accounts for the statistical
disparity.
1. Individual Cases Brought Under McDonnell Douglas
A bill to overcome Hicks would include: (1) a statement of purpose
to conform the law to the scientific understanding of the nature of dis-
crimination; (2) a definition of "intentional" to equal motive, including
discriminatory behavior caused by conscious and unconscious processes;
(3) a definition of prima facie case to include a bare bones prima facie
case; (4) the reaffirmation of the mandatory presumption of the McDon-
nell Douglas/Burdine mode of proof;3 57 (5) an explanation of the theoret-
ical justification for the mandatory presumption; (6) a provision
prohibiting summary judgment of an employment discrimination claim
where there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the
employer's explanation for its action was pretextual; and (8) a broad def-
inition of "pretext" to include not only a conscious bad faith coverup for
a discriminatory action, but also "not the true or real reason for the
behavior."
Under this scheme, the judge would instruct the jury about the na-
ture of discriminatory behavior and the theoretical justification for the
law. The judge would admit testimony of social science experts estab-
lishing the prevalence of unconscious forms of discriminatory decision-
357 The mandatory presumption would not exist in reverse discrimination cases because
the failure to hire a person of the dominant race or gender does not create a presumption that
the failure is because of race or gender unless there are unusual and specific circumstances in
the workplace. See, e.g., Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026 (8d' Cir. 1997); Harding v. Gray, 9
F.3d 150 (D.C. Cir. 1993); McHenry v. Pennsylvania State System of Higher Education, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7188 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1999).
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making.35 8 The judge would give the jury three simple interrogatories to
answer:
(1) Did the plaintiff make out a prima facie case of discrimination?;
(2) If your answer is "yes" to question number one, did the defend-
ant articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its employment
action?; and
(3) If your answer to number two is "yes," did the plaintiff prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the reason defendant gives for its
employment decision is inaccurate or untrue?
If the jury answers all of the questions in the affirmative, judgment
should go to the plaintiff. The instruction about the nature of discrimina-
tion would serve to educate the public about discrimination. The inter-
rogatories would also avoid jury nullification. 35 9
It is possible that the mandatory presumption will hold liable an
employer who did not act from discriminatory attitudes, either conscious
or unconscious. If, for example, Snead fired Lopez to make room for a
friend who is better qualified than Lopez, a jury could conceivably be-
lieve that his argument that the friend was better qualified is pretextual.
The social science research, however, suggests that the opportuni-
ties for underestimating the incidence of discriminatory behavior are
much greater than the reverse.3 60 Reinstatement of the mandatory pre-
358 For a discussion of potential jury instructions and the admissibility of expert testimony
on the unconscious nature of stereotyping, see Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts
About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A Modest Proposal for Re-
opening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L. J. 1487, 1508-17 (1997).
359 Concededly, even a mandatory presumption will not solve all of the proof problems
under the McDonnell Douglas construct. Employers whose judgments about their employees
are unconsciously affected by the employee's race may develop justifications that appear non-
discriminatory.' For example, in the Lopez case, Snead may have records detailing his
problems with Ms. Lopez, her lack of organization, and her inability to get along with her
peers. Unless there is evidence to rebut Lowell Printing's documents or to demonstrate that
white employees with the same problems were treated differently, Ms. Lopez will not be able
to prove pretext. In this scenario, the employer will prevail even though his negative judgment
of the employee may be caused by unconscious discriminatory animus.
360 Research demonstrates that there is a vast difference between perceptions of blacks
and whites and women and men concerning the prevalence of race and sex discrimination. A
recent Gallop poll social audit demonstrates that while 76% of whites believe that blacks are
treated equally in their communities, only 49% of blacks believe that blacks receive equal
treatment. See Executive Summary: The Gallup Poll Social Audit on Black/White Relations in
the United States 6 (June 9, 1997); see also Terry Carter, Divided Justice 43 ABA JOURNAL,
43 (Feb.1999) (stating that more than half of black lawyers participating in a survey of ABA
and National Bar Association members believed that "very much" racial bias exists in the
justice system whereas almost one-third of white lawyers answered "very little" to the same
question).
The perceptual divide is similar for women and men. Although three-quarters of female
attorneys report having experienced gender bias, only one-third of men questioned had ob-
served gender bias. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEx: THE DENIAL OF GENDER
INEQUALry 4 (1997). Even those men who saw sex discrimination against women tended to
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sumption, when combined with a judicial acknowledgment of its pur-
pose, appropriate expert testimony about unconscious discrimination,
proper jury instructions and proper judicial enforcement of summary
judgment standards, can more effectively achieve the purposes of the
Civil Rights Act - eliminating discrimination and compensating victims
without creating an undue burden on employers.
2. Individual Mixed Motives Cases
The bill would reaffirm and expand the stereotypes doctrine as es-
tablished in Price Waterhouse, stating that evidence of stereotyping,
either conscious or unconscious, in the decisionmaking process is rele-
vant to the inquiry as to whether race or sex motivated the employer's
adverse employment decision. The bill would state that discriminatory
comments made by co-workers and employers in the workplace may be
relevant to the determination of whether the protected characteristic mo-
tivated the decision and that evidence of stereotyping in the workplace is
relevant to the question of causation. If the comments do not rise to the
level of direct proof of discrimination, they can be considered along with
other evidence indicating discrimination. Expert testimony about con-
scious and unconscious discrimination and the meaning of the comments
will be admissible to prove causation. If the discriminatory comments
are insufficient to prove causation directly, they can be considered under
the McDonnell Douglas analysis.
The court will instruct the jury that if race or sex is a motivating
factor, the plaintiff will prevail. The instructions should explain the im-
underestimate its significance. See id; see also Phyllis C. Coontz, Gender Bias in the Legal
Profession: Women "See" It, Men Don't in GENDER AND AMERICAN LAW: Tin IMPACT OF THE
LAW ON Hmn LIvEs OF WoMEN 283-84 (Karen J. Maschke, ed., 1997) (finding based on empir-
ical research that women lawyers observe bias in the legal profession significantly more than
men lawyers do).
There is other troubling evidence suggesting that discrimination victims go without re-
dress or compensation for their injuries. Social Science research demonstrates that victims of
discrimination tend to underestimate the extent of the discrimination they suffer. See Faye J.
Crosby et al., The Denial of Personal Disadvantage Among YouMe and All the Other Os-
triches in GENDER AND THouGHT: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 79, 95-97 (Mary Crawford
and Margaret Gentry, eds. 1989). This phenomenon is known as the denial of personal disad-
vantage. See id.
Moreover, persons analyzing whether discrimination exists in individual cases grossly
underestimate the occurrence of discrimination, unless the individual case is presented to the
factfinder as part of a pattern of discrimination. See id.
This research suggests three conclusions: (1) victims of discrimination are more likely to
underuse, rather than overuse, the'statutory remedies available to them; (2) when individuals
bring suits alleging individual discrimination in absence of evidence of a pattern and practice
of discrimination, factfindinders will likely err in defendants' favor; and (3) the determination
of whether discrimination has occurred may be highly dependent upon the race and sex of the
factfinder. In a system where the vast majority of judges are white males, the excessive use of
summary judgment becomes a very real possibility given this research.
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portance of the social science testimony concerning stereotyping and that
stereotyping is an unconscious process, and the particular danger of mak-
ing judgments based on stereotypes when women and persons of color
are underrepresented in the particular job in question.361 It will also ex-
plain that discriminatory remarks made by co-workers or employers are
relevant to the existence of stereotyping in the workplace and to the
question of whether the decision in question was the result of stereotyp-
ing. The court will instruct the jury that if the evidence, including the
discriminatory comments, is insufficient to prove discrimination directly,
the jury should apply the McDonnell Douglas proof mechanism, consid-
ering the comments as evidence of pretext.
3. Pattern and Practice Cases
For pattern and practice cases, the statute should limit the lack of
interest defense to an affirmative defense, provable by the defendant only
to the extent the defendant can prove that a lack of interest unrelated to
employer action accounts for the statistical disparity between the ex-
pected and actual percentages of blacks and women in the workplace.
To the extent the defendant proves some lack of interest, the defendant
will be relieved of liability for the proportion of the lack of interest not
caused by the employer's actions. Thus, the statistical disparity will
raise a rebuttable presumption as to the existence of discrimination and
its extent. The court will instruct the jury as to the nature of stereotyping
and permit expert testimony of the stereotyping involved in the lack of
interest defense.
B. JUDICIAL REFORMS
Although an amendment to Title VII would be preferable in its
scope and ability to overrule Supreme Court precedent, even as the law
stands, lower courts have considerable leeway to conform Title VII law
to the scientific evidence regarding the nature of discrimination. In all
types of disparate treatment cases, courts can define "intent" to include
both conscious and unconscious discrimination, admitting expert testi-
mony explaining the unconscious nature of stereotyping of women and
persons of color, and demonstrating how their stereotypes result in dis-
criminatory behavior. In admitting this testimony, courts can rely on
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Jury instructions can comment on the evi-
dence of social science findings concerning unconscious stereotyping
and how it affects decisionmaking. Courts of Appeals can accept Bran-
deis briefs analyzing the social science literature on the nature of stere-
361 See Martha Chamallas, Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title
VII: Some Contemporary Influences, 92 MicH. L. Rav. 2370, 2379-81 (1994) (explaining that
tokens tend to be more subject to stereotyping).
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otyping and the role it plays in decisionmaking. This reading of the
statute should be permissible because for many years the proof constructs
operated to include unconscious discrimination as illegal and the court
has quietly endorsed such results in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.
After Reeves, courts should regularly permit a factfinder's determi-
nation of liability where there is sufficient evidence from which a reason-
able factfinder can conclude that the employer's articulated reason for
the decision is pretextual. The definition of pretext would include not
only a "coverup," but also that the employer's reason is not the real rea-
son for the employment decision.
Lower courts can permit the introduction of expert testimony ex-
plaining the nature of discrimination and the existence of unconscious
negative attitudes that result in discriminatory behaviors. Following this
testimony, the court can instruct the jury that the statute permits a finding
of discrimination where the act is "intentional," defining "intentional" to
include both conscious and unconscious discrimination. The court would
also instruct the jury that a finding of pretext creates a permissible infer-
ence of discrimination. Here, the judge would explain to the jury the
justification for the permissible inference of discrimination. That justifi-
cation is that the combination of the prima facie case and the finding of
pretext can raise an inference that the employer, in evaluating the em-
ployee, was either consciously or unconsciously influenced by the em-
ployee's race, gender or national origin. Juries would then be required to
decide the factual question of whether the employer's explanation is
pretextual. If so, the jury would be permitted, but not required, to find
for the plaintiff. This option carries with it some risks, since lower courts
are bound by the precedent of higher courts and a number of circuits
might overrule this definition of Title VII law. Nonetheless, since law
evolves from the bottom up,3 62 lawyers practicing in this field should
consider offering expert testimony to the courts upon which they can rely
to define "intentional" to include unconscious as well as conscious dis-
crimination.3 63 Price Waterhouse provides support for this position.
Without legislative change, courts can also make a substantial dif-
ference in the areas of stereotyping and pattern and practice cases.
362 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 194.
363 A second option is less explicit. Lower courts can permit a jury to decide whether an
employer has illegally discriminated against an employee whenever there is sufficient evidence
from which a reasonable jury can conclude that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case
and that the employer's explanation for its decision is pretextual. Once again, the definition of
pretext would be a broad one. The court would not define "intentional" for the jury. Although
this latter option conforms explicitly to Reeves, it gives the jury more power without giving it
more information about the nature of discrimination. Nonetheless, it permits the jury to con-
clude that an employer illegally discriminated based on the combination of a prima facie case
and a finding of pretext.
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Courts can hold that proof of a statistical disparity in a pattern and prac-
tice case creates a presumption of discrimination, rebuttable by the lack
of interest affirmative defense only to the extent that the defendant
proves that the lack of interest is not caused by or contributed to by the
employer's actions. Courts can limit the "stray remarks" doctrine, hold-
ing that discriminatory remarks of co-workers or supervisors in the work-
place are relevant to the question of whether the adverse employment
decision resulted from discrimination by demonstrating that the co-work-
ers or employer harbor stereotypical beliefs and that an atmosphere of
tolerance by an employer may signal discrimination. Even where the
discriminatory remarks and comments do not rise to the level of direct
evidence, courts should hold the remarks are relevant evidence of pretext
in a case using the indirect method of proof under McDonnell Douglas.
This proposal would not unduly burden employers. Although meth-
ods designed to eliminate discrimination in the workplace are not fool-
proof,364 and the relationship among affect, cognition and stereotyping is
extremely complicated, the psychological literature provides hope for
prejudice reduction. Research demonstrates that the mood state or affect
of the evaluator may affect whether he or she relies on stereotypes rather
than processing information that differentiates an individual from the
group's stereotype.3 65 Although the research has not reached a level
whereby psychologists can tell employers exactly what mood states to
evoke and how to do so in order to assure perfectly non-discriminatory
responses, the literature is increasing in sophistication in this area.366
Moreover, Professors Devine and Monteith of the University of Wiscon-
sin have established a model for discrimination reduction for persons
who have already internalized egalitarian principles.3 67 Devine and
Monteith agree that the mere internalization of non-discriminatory prin-
ciples is not sufficient to change the activation of stereotyping and its
consequent behavior; internalization is the first step toward reducing
prejudicial responses.368 Devino and Monteith demonstrate that "low
364 One example of a failed theory is contact hypothesis, which holds that contact alone
between ingroups and outgroups will lead to less prejudice and discrimination. Although this
hypothesis is not always nor totally inaccurate, the contact must occur under very specific
circumstances, some of which even researchers in psychology have not discovered yet. See
Diane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton, Affect, Cognition and Stereotyping: Concluding Coln-
ments, in AFFEcr, CoGNION AND STEREOTYPING 371, 378 (Diane M. Mackie & David L.
Hamilton, eds., 1993) [hereinafter Concluding Comments].
365 See e.g., David L. Hamilton et al., The Influence of Affect on Stereotyping: The Case
of Illusory Correlations in AFFEcr, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 39, 41 (Diane M. Mackie
& David L. Hamilton, eds, 1993).
366 See Mackie & Hamilton, Concluding Comments, supra note 388, at 378-82.
367 See Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, The Role of Discrepancy-Associated
Affect in Prejudice Reduction, in A-iacr, COGNITION, AND STEREOTYPING 317, 334-341 (Di-
ane M. Mackie & David L. Hamilton, eds., 1993).
368 See id. at 334.
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prejudiced" individuals369 can learn inhibitory responses that challenge
the stereotypes and permit them to reduce their automatic prejudicial
responses. 370
Dr. Valian also suggests a number of practical means by which em-
ployers can "nullify the negative professional consequences of gender
schemas and to equalize men's and women's ability to accumulate ad-
vantage. '371 Employers need to create institutional policies that further
the advancement of women and minorities, including effective training
programs for managers.372 Employers should place in positions of power
leaders who are dedicated to furthering equality for women and persons
of color.373 Moreover, employers need to establish and enforce objective
criteria for evaluation.374
Furthermore, as demonstrated by Professor Vicki Schultz, the socio-
logical evidence demonstrates that many practices unwittingly engaged
in by employers can create a disincentive for women and minorities to
apply for positions. For example, employers should reconsider their ad-
vertising for positions, the implicit messages sent through the substantive
ads as well as the modes of advertisement such as word-of-mouth hiring.
They should examine their workforce for sex segregation to determine
what conditions exist that create and reinforce the segregation. Employ-
ers should also examine the traditionally female and male jobs, question-
ing whether the job descriptions are "feminine" and "masculine" because
the jobs are commonly occupied by one sex. They should establish
strong sexual and racial harassment policies in the workplace, enforcing
them with vigor. These policies protect women and minorities who at-
tempt to move into "non-traditional" jobs from harassment. Studies
show that if corporate leaders set a non-racist, non-sexist tone, there is a
significant improvement in the workplace atmosphere for women and
minorities.375
The American Psychological Association agrees that employers can
train employees to reduce the likelihood that stereotypical thinking will
369 Low prejudiced individuals are those who have internalized anti-discriminatory princi-
ples. See Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Stereotypic Responses: Implications for Preju-
dice Reduction Efforts 4 (1991) (dissertation UMI Dissertation Services).
370 See id. at 334-341; see also, Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal
Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. Rev. 733, 759-60 (1995) (advocating
the use of the "dissociation model" to remind jurors of their personal beliefs in order to assure
that their decision making is controlled by personal beliefs rather than by stereotypes).
371 VALIAN, supra note 110, at 303.
372 See id. at 315.
373 See id. at 316-317.
374 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 318.
375 See id. at 316-18; see also, Elusive Equality: The Experiences of Women in Legal
Education, ABA Commission on Women in the Profession, 23-25 (1996) (concluding that the
dean's leadership or lack thereof plays a vital role in granting women faculty equality in law
schools).
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result in discrimination in the workplace.376 Although some studies
question whether an intent to inhibit stereotyping works because it could
produce a rebound effect, 377 a very new study gives hope about the use
of self-focus to inhibit the use of stereotypes in decision making. 378
Moreover, many other studies show that information, increased attention
to the information and motivational incentives supporting the increased
attention as well as demonstrating disapproval of stereotyping have
worked in the past.379 According to the literature cited by the APA, there
are three types of motivational methods that reduce stereotyping: (1) in-
terdependence - an organization that uses teamwork and makes promo-
tions dependent on group projects and emphasizes supervisors'
responsibilities for the success of subordinates; 380 (2) emphasis on accu-
racy and accountability in evaluation;381 and (3) a strong opinion or com-
mitment of superiors or colleagues who discourage stereotyping.382
Dr. Valian suggests training of managerial employees in the concept
of accumulation of advantage and disadvantage and in recognizing when
such accumulation operates to the detriment of women or the benefit of
men;383 she also recommends training managers about gender schemas
and how to reprogram their reactions. One method of reprogramming,
suggests Dr. Valian, is to challenge the assumptions by recalling objec-
tively similar events happening to men and women and comparing our
reactions to them.384 Another means is an experiment in thought, consid-
ering in our minds how we would react to a person of the opposite sex if
he or she performed in the same manner.385
Other means of reducing reliance on gender schemas include devot-
ing more time to evaluations, 386 and creating the opportunity for manag-
ers to devote their full attention to performance evaluations. 387 Studies
of policemen demonstrate that when an evaluator has little time and can-
not devote his full attention to the evaluation, he is more likely to rely on
376 See Amicus Curiae Brief, APA, supra note 189.
377 See generally C. Neil Macrae et al., Out Of Mind But Back In Sight: Stereotypes On
The Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALr=Y & Soc. PSYCHOL. 808 (1994).
378 See generally Macrae et al., supra note 78.
379 See id.
380 See generally Amicus Curia Brief, APA; see also Barbara F. Reskin & Irene Padovic,
Supervisors as Gatekeepers: Male Supervisors' Response To Women's Integration In Plant
Jobs, 35 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 536, 547 (1988).
381 See Amicus Curiae Brief, APA, supra note 189.
382 See id.
383 See VALLAN, supra note 110, at 303.
384 See id. at 305.
385 See id. at 305-06.
386 See id. at 307.
387 See id. at 308-09
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the gender schema.3 88 Increasing accountability reduces reliance on
schemas and increases accuracy.389
Employers can also reduce the chance of unconscious bias affecting
the evaluation of women and blacks by having a greater pool of female
and black employees and applicants. 390 Studies demonstrate that work
units having a larger percentage of women and minorities have a positive
effect on the job performance evaluations of women and minorities.
Data suggests that women will receive a fairer evaluation if they repre-
sent at least 25% of the group.391 According to Valian:
That percentage of women not only reduces the availability of the
female gender schema but, just as significantly, it alters perceptions of
the job itself. A job held by both males and females in reasonable num-
bers appears to be a human job rather than a male or female job.392
Finally, managers need training in cognitive failures such as failure
to appreciate covariation, 393 blocking of relevant hypothesis, 394 and illu-
sory correlation. 395 Each of these is a reasoning error that tends to vali-
388 See id. at 308; R.F. Martell, Sex Bias, at Work: The Effects of Attentional And Mem-
ory Demands On Performance Ratings Of Men and Women, 21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
1939-60 (1991).
389 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 308.
390 A study of employers' evaluations of female employees demonstrated that the nega-
tive ratings were inversely proportional to the number of women in the work group. Where
women represented only 1-10% of the work group, the women received more negative ratings
than the men; where they constituted 11-20% of the group, their ratings were somewhat less
negative; when women comprised 50% of the group, their ratings were more positive than the
men's. See VALmN, supra note 110, at 140, 309-310; Paul R. Sackett et al., supra note 121, at
266-267. Increased numbers of blacks in the organization, however, did not lead to higher
evaluations in this study. See id
391 See VALmAN, supra note 110, at 309 (1998); Madeline D. Heilman, The Impact of
Situational Factors on Personnel Decisions Concerning Women: Varying the Sex Composition
of the Applicant Pool, in 26 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN PERFORMANCE 386-393
(1980) (finding that the proportion of women in the applicant pool for a traditional male job
can have an impact on personnel decisionmaking). There is also some support for the "contact
theory" which theorizes that stereotypes will be reduced in white male workplaces if persons
of color and women are given an opportunity to work with white males in what have formerly
been considered jobs for white males. See Barbara F. Reskin & Irene Padavic, Supervisors As
Gatekeepers: Male Supervisors' Response To Women's Integration in Plant Jobs, 35 Soc.
PROBLEMS 536, 537, 547.
392 VALIAN, supra note 110, at 309 (citing C. Hoffman & N. Hurst, Gender Stereotypes,
58 J. PERsONALrrY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 197-208 (1990).
393 A failure to appreciate covariation will lead to faulty conclusions. Dr. Valian explains
covariation by describing a study concluding that women are more likely than men to correctly
analyze statistical information demonstrating hiring bias against women. See VALIAN, supra
note 110, at 310-312.
394 Blocking is a phenomenon common to men and women. It explains that a person
holding a gender schema will tend to disregard important information concerning causation of
another's performance if the performance fits with the expected gender schema. See VALIAN,
supra note 110, at 312-313.
395 See VALIAN, supra note 110, at 310. "Illusory correlation" is a cognitive process that
"could have a particularly negative influence on evaluations of women in male-dominated
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date gender and/or race schemas and to operate against a fair evaluation
of women and minorities in the workplace. Although the psychological
literature suggests that training alone will not completely cure the reli-
ance on stereotypes since such reliance is often an automatic response
generated by a combination of affect and cognitive processes, training
has proven successful in workplaces in the past.
396
IV. CONCLUSION: EVOLUTIONARY PATTERNS IN
STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW: PRESERVING
AND RENEWING THE CAT'S CLAVICLE
In Tim COMMON LAW, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes compares
legal precedent to the clavicle of the cat. The clavicle (a collarbone)
"tells of the existence of some earlier creature to which a collarbone was
useful" just as precedent survives long after its original use is over. Jus-
tice Holmes notes that old legal rules are retained, gaining new justifica-
tions for the old rules:
Every important principle which is developed by litiga-
tion is in fact and at bottom the result of more or less
definitely understood views of public policy; most gen-
erally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the
unconscious result of instinctive preferences and inartic-
ulate convictions, but none the less traceable to views of
public policy in the last analysis. {W}hen ancient rules
maintain themselves.. . , new reasons more fitted to the
time have been found for them, and ... they gradually
receive a new content, and at last a new form, from the
grounds to which they have been transplanted. 397
This article demonstrates that, perhaps the "unconscious result of
instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions," Title VII law has
professions." See id. at 314. Illusory correlation occurs when there are two groups and one
group is the dominant and more prevalent group. In this situation, observers overestimate the
frequency with which the less prevalent group - women in a male-dominated profession -per-
form the less frequent behavior - incompetent behavior. Thus, the cognitive error will over-
emphasize and overestimate the incompetence of women even though incompetence occurs
equally as frequently in women and men. See id.
396 The work of Professor Monteith suggests that at least low-prejudiced employees, if
trained properly, can reduce their stereotypic responses. See Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regula-
tion of Stereotypic Responses: Implication for Prejudice Reduction Efforts (1991) (unpub-
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin - Madison). Employers could presumably
give psychological tests to job applicants to assure that they hire low-prejudiced individuals
and they could follow up with proper training of employees.
397 See OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs, Tim COMMON LAw, 31-32 (1963). Justice Holmes'
theory has been called "evolutionary pragmatism." See E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary
Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 38, 51 (quoting P. Wiener, EVOLUTION AND
TH FOUNDERS OF PRAGMATISM 172 (1949)).
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evolved proof constructs and substantive doctrines that permit factfinders
to hold defendants liable for unequal discriminatory treatment of women
and minorities, whether or not the employer is consciously aware of the
discriminatory treatment. This article also shows, however, that the
evolution spawned a counter-evolution, a narrowing of proof mecha-
nisms, and a limitation on substantive doctrines. This counter-evolution
was caused, in large part, by the courts' failure to articulate "new reasons
more fitted to the time" justifying the evolution.
The article proposes that the "old" legal rules - which originally
evolved to prove discrimination - be renewed even though the former
justification for the constructs may no longer survive scrutiny. It sug-
gests that social science literature demonstrating the unconscious nature
of racial and gender stereotyping, bias, prejudice, and behavior provides
the "new reasons" to justify the rules developed during the evolutionary
process. If Title VII is to fulfill its purpose, it must define discrimination
in accordance with scientific understanding. The law can no longer limit
its definition of discrimination to conscious discriminatory behavior; the
definition should also include behavior that is rooted in unconscious
prejudice.
This article demonstrates that the traditional proof mechanisms pro-
vide a practical method of identifying employers who have uncon-
sciously made discriminatory employment decisions; it recommends
legislation restoring the use of the traditional proof mechanisms, com-
bined with expert testimony about the nature of unconscious discrimina-
tion and jury instructions defining intent to include both conscious and
unconscious discrimination.
In the absence of legislative reform, this article suggests a narrow
reading of Hicks, an expansive reading of Price Waterhouse and the ste-
reotypes doctrine, and greater reliance on statistics in pattern and practice
cases. It also recommends improved expert testimony and jury instruc-
tions and more exacting summary judgment standards.
This article demonstrates that the evolution of the doctrine is consis-
tent with the theory that discriminatory intent or motive fulfills the pur-
pose of establishing causation in a discrimination case; to the extent the
courts are currently turning back that evolution by focusing on the culpa-
bility of the discriminator, the doctrine does not fulfill the purposes of
the statute.
Thus, we should trust the evolution. Like the cat's clavicle, the Mc-
Donnell Douglas construct, the stereotypes doctrine and the use of statis-
tics in the pattern and practice cases are important evolutions in Title VII
law that the courts should respect. In order to preserve this evolution,
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which is consistent with social science research and fulfills the broad
purposes of the original Act, the legislature and/or the courts must articu-
late a new justification for the "old" rules that evolved early in the his-
tory of Title VII.
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